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This Paper provides a map of mediation models and analyzes the
intellectual context from which they emerge. Through reference to categories
such as the nature of the process, the role of the mediator, the perceptions of
the parties, the ideological framework, and other classifications, the Paper
portrays contemporary mediation discourse as a multicultural field. The
Paper then explores the implications of the division over revaluating
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discussions within the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) field, and goes on
to discuss commonalities and differences among the models. After defining
the basic elements of the mediation language, the Paper proceeds to evaluate
the theoretical implications of such an interpretive inquiry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Paper begins, following Lon Fuller's terminology, by perceiving
mediation as a "form of social order."' This form is examined as changing
over time, and as containing diverse cultures or intellectual traditions.
Mediation is not merely an alternative, nor a private process within this
framework, but a discourse that carries legal meaning and which can be used
to enforce and implement the Rule of Law,2 encompassing its highest values.
Mediation represents the extreme "alternative" to adjudication, and thus can
be used as the paradigm of dispute resolution emphasis in law.3 Thus, the
terms "mediation" and "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (ADR)4 will be
alternated throughout this Paper as representing the developing discipline
that aspires to transcend the adversarial model, although the ADR field
encompasses adjudicative and adversarial processes as well. In a sense, an
effective process of realization and internalization of the social order today
cannot be imagined without the use of mediation skills.
The move from "forms of mediation" to "cultures of dispute resolution"
is another foundational theme in this Paper-culture is defined in many
ways, and whole books could be dedicated to its various meanings and their
1 See Lon L. Fuller, The Role of Contract in the Ordering Processes of Society
Generally, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF L. L. FULLER 187,
189 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., rev. ed. 2001).
2 "The Rule of Law" implies a commitment to control society by law and not by
arbitrary force. Within the context of this Paper it implies the symbolic order of the
community, which has full formal expression in legal rules and precedents, but which
also carries beliefs and ideologies that must be internalized by the subjects of the law.
3 On mediation as "the sleeping giant of dispute resolution" as described by Sander
see Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 54, 55.
See also BERNARD S. MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 189 (2000). On how the "law of ADR" represents the dispute
resolution emphasis in law, see Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211 (1995).
4 The Alternative Dispute Resolution movement in the US (the ADR movement)
emerged during the late 1970s, has been institutionalized, and has spread around the
country transforming the judicial system to include various mechanisms and alternatives
to adjudication as part of its routine services. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 216-22.
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implications. 5 However, in this Paper, culture is perceived as the material
from which the mediation process is built. Culture, to paraphrase a Weberian
definition, involves 'those webs' of significance that man spins for
himself, ' 6 which give meaning to our perceptions and activities. We can
perceive the world, and the conflicts within it, through various grids and
frames of reference. Basically, it is a self-referential system; i.e., we
construct reality through the culture we adopt in perceiving it. Thus, one of
the basic arguments of this Paper is that multicultural interaction occurs not
only between our "official" cultures, but between our diverse understandings
of conflict and mediation. While focusing on ADR and on mediation
discourse, the Paper will explore the multicultural aspect of conducting
conflict resolution processes and present the practice as carrying diverse
cultures. In a sense, when Lon Fuller spoke in his famous mediation article of
mediation as "all process and no structure,"7 he may have meant that
mediation produces a self-referential constructive culture which can be
weaved into any conflict or substantial clash of interests. This re-reading of
Fuller's emphasis will guide the inquiry in this Paper.
The mediation process, in its deepest meaning, can be presented as a
search for a process, or for a "shared culture" of conflict resolution, which at
its end determines the nature of the outcome of the conflict and the solution
to it. Following from this idea, it will be argued that a developed notion of
mediation will strive to actively "read" the multicultural interaction in the
most constructive way possible, 8 and not through a "clash of civilizations" 9
lens. The framing of the basic elements of the mediation language in the third
part of this Paper will proceed along the lines of mediating between the
existing cultures.
Returning to the "cultures of dispute resolution" argument, the Paper will
demonstrate how the discourse of mediation in Western thought has
developed a few cultures of approaching a conflict, which reflect intellectual
5 See KEVIN AVRUCH, CULTURE & CONFLICT RESOLUTION 5-21 (1998) (providing a
comprehensive overview of the development of the concept of culture, and for a
definition of it within the context of conflict resolution).
6 See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3-32 (2000) (introducing
the interpretive notion of culture and the definition of Weber).
7 Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 307
(1971).
8 The reference here is to Dworkin's notion of constructive interpretation, imported
into the field of mediation. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985).
9 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER (1st ed. 1997).
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ideas and implement, at some levels, a critique of liberalism. The reference to
"Western thought" is necessary since the effort is to expose the intellectual
roots of modem mediation, while assuming that this is only a preliminary
introduction to the more burning multicultural conflicts of our time,
including interactions with other cultures such as Islam, Eastern thought,
ethnic minority communities, or any other identity-based groups. The
diversity and heterogeneity of the Western culture of conflict resolution,
discussed below, will help to deconstruct the idea of any clash of rigid
civilizations and will come back to the nuanced single interaction which
always reflects diverse cultural resources.
Following the multicultural map of mediation that will be presented in
the second part, some implications of the division over prominent ADR
debates will be offered in the third part, referring to themes such as
"imbalance of power," "mandatory mediation," and "legal advice in
mediation." The fourth part will extract the common elements of any
mediation practice and will focus on the uniqueness of this discipline,
phrased in broad terms. As a final discussion, the Paper will return to an
analysis of the theoretical and practical implications of the differences
between the models, and will offer some preliminary guidelines and
preferences to address ADR in its multiplicity.
II. A CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL MAP OF MEDIATION
A. Anatomy of Styles: An Overview
According to the theoretical scheme suggested in this Paper, on the
professional level, mediation is surrounded by lawyers on one side and
therapists on the other, each aiming to produce a "mediator identity" that is at
once pragmatic and therapeutic. A contemporary third professional identity
that might be considered as transcending the pragmatic or therapeutic poles is
the anthropological social therapist or visionary, who portrays mediation as a
social scene that can be manipulated and reconstructed through storytelling
and narratives. On the theoretical academic level, mediation can be perceived
as being located between the social sciences and the humanities, between law
and psychology. Evolving models of mediation thus reflect the complex
location of mediation on the professional and theoretical levels. Two
theoretical paradigms define the borders for the developing models. One is
the rational-scientific paradigm, guided by game theory and the social
324
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sciences. 10 The other is the interpretive paradigm, inspired by the humanities
and based on storytelling and narratives.11 Both of them are descriptive, and
portray the situation of conflict as open to diverse styles of intervention.12
The models move from the first paradigm to the latter as they progress, and
thus, the broad theoretical picture portrayed by this Paper is connected with a
humanizing of the mediation discourse, perceiving it as guided by narratives
and conflicting cultures.
The three practical models that will be presented here are the pragmatic
model, the transformative model, and the narrative model. The argument
surrounding these models explores their evolution as representing intellectual
development within the history of ideas, and draws links between legal
schools of thought and their equivalent trends in mediation. The claim is that,
at the turn of the century, mediation incorporates public qualities of the law
("going public"), and the more contemporary model-the narrative model-
embodies legal sensitivities and represents the most "progressive" model of
mediation known to date. The shift from one model to another is presented as
a gradual move away from the rational-scientific paradigm of conflict
resolution, inspired by the social sciences, toward a more interpretive
paradigm inspired by the humanities. Under the interpretive paradigm of
mediation, narratives are considered the materials from which mediation is
made, and cultural analysis is a basic tool of mediation work.13
The discussion of the models begins from a positivistic, pragmatic
approach, continues with a relational construction of the process, and ends
with a postmodem view of mediation. 14 The research explores the links
10 For a preliminary presentation of this paradigm see MICHAL ALBERSTEIN,
PRAGMATISM AND LAW 323-25 (2002). For a more elaborate discussion of the paradigm
see MICHAL ALBERSTEIN, A JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDIATION ch. 7 (in Hebrew forthcoming
2007).
11 For a preliminary presentation of this paradigm see ALBERSTEIN, PRAGMATISM
AND LAW, supra note 10, at 330-40. For a more elaborate discussion of the paradigm see
ALBERSTEIN, A JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDIATION, supra note 10, at ch. 12.
12 For an illustration of the game theories of bargaining, and thus, rational-scientific
paradigm, in conflict resolution, see generally KENNETH J. ARROW, ROBERT H. MNOOKIN,
LEE Ross, AMOS TVERSKY & ROBERT B. WILSON, BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
(1999). The interpretive model, or paradigm, can be traced in books such as NEW
DIRECTIONS IN MEDIATION: COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND PERSPECTIVES (Joseph P.
Folger & Tricia S. Jones eds., 1994). It remains underdeveloped in terms of academic
literature.
13 See ALBERSTEIN, A JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDIATION, supra note 10, at 330-40.
14 For a preliminary definition of postmodernism, see Encyclopedia Britannica
Online, http://www.britannica.com (search for "Ethical relativism and postmodemism")
(last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
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between perceptions of the "human" in Western thought and the
development of practical models of mediation. It reveals ways in which
assumptions regarding the nature of conflict-the basic orientations of the
parties, the role of the mediator, the process of mediation, the implications of
imbalance between the parties, the relation of mediation to law, and the level
of success in mediation--derive from diverse theoretical perceptions of the
human condition. Fundamental philosophical questions such as, "Does nature
precede culture or vice versa?", "Are humans by nature egoistic or
altruistic?", "What is the relationship between body and mind?", and "What
is justice?", receive answers within mediation discourse. These answers are
generally divided along the lines of three cultural worldviews: liberalism,
critique of liberalism through relational ideas, and postmodernism.15 Since
the entire discourse of mediation and alternatives to courts is relatively new
and developing in part as a response to the postmodern condition and as a
reflection of distrust of the old professions, 16 it is interesting to see how, in
only a few decades, it has managed to embrace the whole circle of liberalism
and its critique, including its latest development-an explicit, postmodern
practical model. Three practical models will therefore be analyzed herein.
First is the pragmatic approach: the "classical" problem-solving model of
mediation, primarily known from Roger Fisher and William Ury's bestseller,
Getting To Yes, 17 and based on classical liberalism.' 8 Next is the
[P]ostmodernism, a complex philosophical movement that questioned the idea of
objectivity in many areas, including ethics. Many postmodernists regarded the very
idea of objectivity as a dubious invention of the modem-i.e., post-Enlightenment-
era. From the time of the Enlightenment, most philosophers and scientists believed
that there is an objective, universal, and unchanging truth about everything-
including science, ethics, religion, and politics-and that human reason is powerful
enough to discover this truth. The eventual result of rational inquiry, therefore, was
to be one science, one ethics, one religion, and one politics that would be valid for
all people in all eras. According to postmodemism, however, the Enlightenment-
inspired idea of objective truth, which has influenced the thinking of virtually all
modem scientists and philosophers, is an illusion that has now collapsed.
Id.
151d.
16 For more discussion of the relationship between postmodemism and ADR, see
infra notes 46--51 and accompanying text.
17 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOuT GIVING IN (1983).
18 For a broad definition of Liberalism as discussed in this Paper, see Encyclopedia
Britannica Online, http://www.britannica.com (search for "Liberalism") (last visited Mar.
12, 2006).
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transformative approach: the therapeutic model of mediation constructed in
the mid-1990s by Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger.19 This approach is
based on the relational vision and focuses on process, empowerment and
recognition, rather than on problem-solving. 20 Finally, the narrative
approach is discussed: the storytelling, constructivist model of mediation
introduced by Winslade and Monk in 2001, based on a postmodern
interpretive worldview. 21
Liberalism derives from two related features of Western culture. The first is the
West's preoccupation with individuality, as compared to the emphasis in other
civilizations on status, caste, and tradition. Throughout much of history, the
individual has been submerged in his clan, tribe, people, or kingdom. Liberalism is
the culmination of developments in Western society that produced a sense of the
importance of human individuality, a liberation of the individual from complete
subservience to the group, and a relaxation of the tight hold of custom, law, and
authority. The emancipation of the individual can be understood as a unique
achievement of Western culture, perhaps its very hallmark. Liberalism also derives
from the practice of adversariality in European political and economic life, a process
in which institutionalized competition-such as the competition between different
political parties in electoral contests, between prosecution and defense in judicial
procedures, or between different producers in a free-market economy-is used to
generate a dynamic social order. Adversarial systems have always been precarious,
however, and it took a long time for the belief in adversariality to emerge from the
more traditional view, traceable at least to Plato, that the state should be an organic
structure in which the different social classes cooperate by performing distinct yet
complementary roles. The belief that competition is an essential part of a political
system and that good government requires a vigorous opposition was still
considered strange in most European countries in the early 19th century. Underlying
the liberal belief in adversariality is the conviction that human beings are essentially
rational creatures capable of settling their political disputes through dialogue and
compromise.
19 ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).
20 Bush & Folger define the relational vision as:
[A]n emerging, new vision of self and society, one based on relational connection
and understanding rather than on individual autonomy alone. Scholars and thinkers
in many different fields have begun to articulate and advocate a major shift in moral
and social vision-from an individualistic to a relational and interactive conception.
ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 23-24 (rev. ed.
2005) (emphasis in original).
21 JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2000).
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A basic argument of this Paper is that mediation discourse represents a
rich context in which various styles of mediation develop in response to
changing ideas in society and culture. Each style has its own theoretical and
ideological background, and adopting any one carries a set of assumptions
regarding the nature of human beings, the causes of conflict, the ethical
commitments of the mediator, the mediation process, the worldview
underlying the process, and other factors.
B. Worldview
Three intellectual worldviews, or cultures, underlie mediation:
liberalism, critique of liberalism through relational ideas, and
postmodernism. 22
The first mediation model, the pragmatic approach, reflects the
mainstream training and professional perception of mediation and represents
a liberal culture.23 The emergence of modem mediation discourse begins
with developments arising from studies of negotiation. 24 Negotiation
literature describes two primary approaches to negotiation: distributive
(adversarial) and cooperative (integrative).25 The approach used greatly
affects the relationship between the parties, the manner of conducting
negotiations, and the outcomes.26 Most early negotiation theories dealt with
the distributive style, "a kind of contest in which each party is trying to
win," 27 and investigated the strategies designed to maximize one party's
share of the resources in dispute, to minimize losses for that party, and to
achieve domination.2 8 These theories presumed an-argument over a single
matter (such as money) and the parties' inherently contrasting interests
regarding that matter, making one party's victory the inevitable loss of the
other.2 9
22 ALBERSTEIN, A JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDIATION, supra note 10, at Introduction.
2 3 Id. at ch. 8.
24 See Robert A. Baruch Bush, What do we Need a Mediator for?: Mediation's
'Value-Added' for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 6-18 (1996)
(discussing the various barriers as described by negotiation literature and suggesting that
mediation should offer more than management of these barriers).
25 Roy J. LEWICKI, ET AL., NEGOTIATION 74-146 (4th ed. 2003).
2 6 Id. at 30-73.
27 THOMAs C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 3 (1960).
2 8 See NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 1 (Peyton Young ed., 1999).
29 Id.
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The cooperative mode of interdependence, well-known in negotiation
literature, was considered an alternative motivational orientation to the
competitive or individualistic orientation. 30 Though several scholars had
earlier emphasized the importance of integrative bargaining or collaborative
mediation, it was not until the 1980s, as the Cold War receded, that this
integrative style prevailed. Fisher and Ury's 1981 book, Getting to Yes:
Negotiating Without Giving In, symbolized a shift in the perspective on
negotiation from a competitive to a cooperative activity.31 This approach also
inspired the emergence of modern mediation discourse, and framed what
may be defined as the "pragmatic" model of mediation, or what some
describe as "principled negotiation. '32 The authors distinguish between
"positional bargaining," divided between hard and soft (competitive and
cooperative) approaches, and the "meta-game" that underlies the negotiation
procedure.33 This second negotiation, usually implicit, may escape notice;
but it can prevent the either-or dichotomy of the hard-soft negotiation. 34
Parties in a positional bargaining situation may better perceive themselves as
collaborative problem-solvers and, hence, enter into "principled
negotiation. '35 The term "integrative bargaining," variously known as
cooperative, collaborative, "win-win," or "problem solving," describes a
negotiation in which the parties' goals are not mutually exclusive and both
sides can achieve their objectives. 36 It remains liberal in its basic
assumptions and claims to "prove" the advantage of collaboration. 37
Mediation is a method employed to maximize mutual gain according to this
view.38
The second mediation model is the transformative approach. After
fifteen years of the ongoing practice of problem-solving mediation, Bush and
Folger offered a new reading of the discourse by refreshing and refraining
the "promise of mediation. ' 39 Their book provides a first moment of
30 See LEWICKI, supra note 25, at 113-17.
31 FISHER & URY, supra note 17.
3 2 See, e.g., LEWICKI, supra note 25, at 113.
33 FISHER & URY, supra note 17, at 9-10.
34 Id. at 8-10.
35 Id. at 10.
3 6 See LEWICKI, supra note 25, at 113.
3 7 See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J.
369 (1995).
38 For a description of Fisher & Ury's method as constituting a mediation model see
ALBERSTEIN, A JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDIATION, supra note 10, at ch. 8.
39 This is the name of their book, see BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19.
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reflection within the developing discourse of mediation, a kind of a
Dworkinian moment of constructive reading, which tries to offer the best
interpretation of the evolving practice. 40 These commentators suggest
moving away from what they call the "satisfaction story" represented by both
negotiation studies ideology and the pragmatic call, and to adopt a positive
view of conflict, one which emphasizes "empowerment and recognition" as
basic values. 41 Parties in mediation can experience moral growth and
improve their communication skills, according to Bush and Folger,
regardless of the outcomes of the process and without necessarily satisfying
their actual needs. 42 Mediation has a relational dimension that should be
emphasized and promoted. The model of humanistic mediation, as developed
by Umbreit, 43 and the victim-offender mediation inspired by ideas of
restorative justice,44 can both be located within this stage of critique of
liberalism and in its appeal to community and relationship.
40 For a presentation of how law is like a chain novel, in which each judge writes a
new chapter, see Ronald Dworkin, How Law is like Literature, in DWORKIN, supra note
8, at 146.
41 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 84-94.
42 Id. at 94-95.
43 Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic Mediation: A Transformative Journey of
Peacemaking, 14 MEDIATION Q. 201 (1997). The principles of humanistic mediation are
listed by Umbreit as follows:
* Centering. Clearing the mind of clutter and focusing on the important
peacemaking task at hand.
" Refraining the Mediator's Role. Facilitating a process of dialogue and mutual
aid instead of directing a settlement-driven process.
* Conducting Premediation Sessions. Listening to each party's story, providing
information, obtaining voluntary participation, assessing the case, clarifying
expectations, preparing for the mediation phase.
" Connecting with the Parties. Building rapport and trust beginning in pre-
mediation phase.
* Coaching on Communication. If required, during premediation sessions.
* Using a Nondirective Style of Mediation.
* Face-to-Face Seating of Victim and Offender. Unless inappropriate because of
culture of parties or individual request.
* Recognizing and Using the Power of Silence.
* Conducting Follow-up Sessions
Id. at 205.
44 See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW Focus To CRIME AND JUSTICE
(1990).
330
[Vol. 22:2 20071
CULTURES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The third model, the narrative model, developed from a critique of the
problem-solving model.45 It is explicitly based on an approach called "social
constructionism," which is inspired by postmodernism and can be
characterized by four features: "antiessentialism, antirealism, language as a
precondition thought, and language as a form of social action. '46 The
narrative model, for the first time, produces a postmodern theory for a
process (mediation) that was previously considered to have been inspired by
the postmodern condition.47 It is interesting that the postmodernist
worldview, famous for its attack on modernism and progress accompanied by
denial of any program or truth,48 here produces a constructive, manual-based
approach to conflict management. Its training manual, published by Jossey-
Bass, is not nihilist as a postmodernist approach might expect, but rather uses
deconstruction to heal broken relationships and to weave alternative
narratives. Other approaches that emphasize postmodernism as a theoretical
foundation to mediation and conflict resolution are Coordinated Management
of Meaning (CMM), developed by Shailor,49 and the Narrative Perspective,
as offered by Cobb.50 The transformation of the postmodern worldview from
a nihilist critique into a foundation of practical models of conflict resolution
reflects the intellectual mood of our times, and is a culmination of a process
that has emerged in equivalence to the development of the ADR movement,
which was itself inspired by the postmodern condition.51
C. The Parties
Who are the parties to the dispute? How are they perceived and what is
their subject position? It turns out that each model portrays its own "parties,"
and these are constructed through the diverse worldviews. 52
45 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 32-37.
46 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 37-41.
47 See, e.g., Sara Cobb, A Narrative Perspective on Mediation: Toward the
Materialization of the "Storytelling' Metaphor, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN MEDIATION, supra
note 12, at 48.
4 8 See supra note 14.
4 9 JONATHAN G. SHAILOR, EMPOWERMENT IN DISPUTE MEDIATION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION (1994).
50 Sara Cobb, Empowerment and Mediation: A Narrative Perspective, 9 NEGOT. J.
245 (1993); Cobb, supra note 47, at 48.
51 See, e.g., Dale Bagshaw, The Three M's-Mediation, Postmodernism and The
New Millennium, 18 MEDIATION Q. 205 (2001); see also OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW,
CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005).
52 See supra Part I of this article.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
According to the pragmatic perception, the parties are perceived as
rational maximizers -who aspire to expand the pie while transcending the
distributive framework.53 As mentioned, Bush and Folger define this attitude
as "the satisfaction" story, and emphasize its focus on addressing needs and
reaching optimal outcomes. 54
The transformative model assumes a more altruistic, ethical perception of
the parties. Parties are not separate maximizers; instead, they are both related
and separate, bounded within a relationship. 55 Their basic interest is to
actualize themselves-to empower and express care and recognition-and
thereby to experience moral growth.56 Their motivations are not based on
needs but on the "ethics of care," and mediators should try to promote this
dimension of their connectedness. 57 Parties basically aspire to go beyond
their needs. On the one hand, they approach the mediation parties as moral
agents, capable of transcending their needs and biases by being profoundly
human.58 On the other hand, Gilligan's 59 foundation of this model60 suggests
that the tendency toward the other is natural and is not a manifestation of
pure reason. 61 Parties to mediation are naturally connected to one another
and need to strengthen their interrelationship. 62 Related perceptions such as
humanistic mediation and restorative justice repeat the same idea of
connectedness, sometimes accompanied by religious sensitivities.
63
53 See supra Part II.A of this article (discussing evolving negotiation models).
54 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 16-18.
55 Id. at 243.
56 1d. at 81-84.
57 Id.
58 1d.
5 9 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); see also supra notes 39-44, at the accompanying text.
6 0 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 255.
61 For a discussion of the moral ethics in negotiation in terms of the models, see
Michal Alberstein, On Biases, Partiality and Bounded Rationality: Anatomy of Decision
Making's Framings in Negotiation and Law, in LAW, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 657 (Oma
Ben Naftali & Hanna Naveh eds., Ramot-Tel Aviv University 2005) (in Hebrew).
62 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 248-49.
63 See, e.g., Umbreit, supra note 43, at 5.
Prior to initiating contact between people in conflict, the mediator(s) is
encouraged to take a few moments of silence, through reflection, mediation, or
prayer, to reflect on the deeper meaning of his or her peacemaking work and the
needs of the people in conflict. The centering of the mediator throughout the entire
process of preparation and mediation also helps the parties in conflict to experience
it as a safe, if not sacred, journey toward genuine dialogue and healing.
332
[Vol. 22:2 2007]
CULTURES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Under the perception of the narrative model, parties are not angels, but
neither are they motivated by internal existing natural needs. They are
"creatures of discourse," i.e., constructed by language and operating
according to the rules of language games. The parties are trapped by
discourse and speak only through its scripts and narratives, such that the only
way to escape their situation is for them to deconstruct their narrative and
move to a different discursive framework.64 When the language game
changes, so will the parties' self-perception. A narrative view of conflict
assumes "multiple subjectivity," 65 depicting identities for the parties that are
flexible enough to be elastically shaped to reach constructive goals. Sara
Cobb defines this social constructionist perception of the parties as "the
second-generation" mediation practice,66 which emphasizes "careful ongoing
observation of self-in-interaction. ' 67
D. Conflict Definition
The conflict perception of the pragmatic model assumes a frustration of
needs presented as a fight over positions.68 Underneath the positional level,
which is the surface of the conflict, Fisher and Ury describe the interest-
based level, which is the real core of the conflict: "The basic problem in a
negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but in the conflicts between each
side's needs, desires, concerns and fears .... Interests motivate people. They
are the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions.' '69 Once the parties to
the conflict learn to balance their unmet needs, homeostasis is restored.70 The
consequential emphasis of this search is clear. The mediation ideal is to
Id.
64 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 52-53.
65 Id. at 44.
66 Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute
Resolution Practice, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017, 1028-29 (2001).
6 7 1d. at 1026.
68 For this account of the pragmatic model see WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21,
at 33-34.
69 FISHER & URY, supra note 17, at 40-41.
70 The reference to "frustration of needs" and to the "biological metaphor of
homeostasis" is based on WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21. They offer this description
and criticize it in the introduction to their narrative model. "Conflict is assumed to
happen because individual needs are not being met. Disputes transpire when individuals
in the attempt to fulfill their needs, encounter others who believe that their own need
fulfillment goals are threatened." See id. at 33-34.
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restore the balance of needs, and to help the parties "solve the problem"
while addressing their underlying interests. 71
The transformative school takes a different view of conflict. Conflict
represents a rift in the relational texture within which the parties are located,
and thus, the ideal response to it is to restore the relationship between self
and other, encouraging empowerment and recognition.72 Bush and Folger
perceive conflict not as a problem, as the pragmatic approach might claim,
but as an opportunity to experience moral growth in both dimensions of
relation, to self and to other.73 Conflict in mediation is neither the frustration
of needs nor the struggle over limited resources, but reflects the inability to
negotiate these problems efficiently due to emotional and relational
barriers.74
The narrative model assumes that conflict exists only within the
narratives of the parties and not "outside. ' '75 The parties are socially
constructed and their conflict exists due to their clashing perceptions of
entitlement. 76 A conflict tends to escalate and develop into an infamously
rigid,77 closed narrative, which resists counter-interpretations and spills over
into other conflicts and problems. 78
E. Process Definition
The pragmatic model views the process as collaborative problem-
solving, based on objective principles and operated through de-
personalization. 79 It is a search for win-win solutions based on interests or
needs.80 It is a collaborative, facilitated negotiation that assumes full flow of
information and a cooperative motivational business-like approach. 81
71 Id. at 33-34.
72 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 13-14.
73 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 82-84.
74 This interpretation can be inferred from various texts discussing transformative
mediation. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 24.
75 See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 38-39, 52-54.
7 6 Id. at 94-96.
77 See Cobb, supra note 47, at 52-59.
78 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 58-61.
79 See FISHER & URY, supra note 17, at 10-14.
80 Id.
81 See LEWICKI, supra note 25, at 113-17.
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The transformative model aspires to transform from weakness to strength
while improving the relational context of the dispute. 82 After such a process,
the parties will be sufficiently empowered to negotiate the problem by
themselves.83 This could be described as preparation for problem-solving. In
terms of other models guided by the relational-communal worldview,
mediation has a ceremonial aspect of community empowerment, and
sometimes even religious symbols play into the process. 84
Under the narrative perception, the shift to an alternative narrative is the
core of mediation. 85 Parties criticize the discourse that conditions their
choices, and they decide to actively reread until the narrative is changed and
the situation transformed. 86
F. Definition of Success
The question of what constitutes success in mediation is crucial for
evaluation of ADR programs and for improving the training and conduct of
mediators. Each model offers its own notion of success, and thus, each
evaluation should consider the various measures offered by these models.
The pragmatic model is the most utilitarian and efficiency oriented model.87
It is considered the most classical criterion for the evaluation of ADR
programs. 88 Because the main incentive for the development of alternatives
to courts with caseloads and full dockets is considered to be a pragmatic
concern, the practical question of whether the parties have reached an
agreement, and what the qualities of it are, is very important.89
The transformative model was initially inspired by an effort to go beyond
82 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 82-84.
83 Id.
84 See Umbreit, supra note 43, at 3-6. "Prior to initiating contact between people in
conflict, the mediator(s) is encouraged to take a few moments of silence, through
reflection meditation or prayer, to reflect on the deeper meaning of his or her
peacemaking work .... "Id. at 4.
85 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 57-62.
86 Id.
87 For discussion of the worldview and values which inspires the pragmatic model
see supra Part II.B. of this article.
88 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiations:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 760 (1984) (offering criteria
for evaluations of ADR programs).
89 For evaluations of ADR programs in terms of the efficiency criteria see MENKEL-
MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 873-92
(2005).
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the satisfaction story and to look for more qualitative criteria for evaluating
success of ADR programs. 90 Following this assumption, the main emphasis
of this model is on the transformative value of the process, rather than the
actual outcomes of it.91 The criteria offered by Bush and Folger suggest that
"small steps count,"'92 and thus, even limited signs of empowerment or
recognition constitute a success in mediation.
The narrative model involves a distinct perception of reality as socially
constructed, 93 and thus, satisfaction in terms of material conditions or actual
agreement is not its main concern. Since the mediation process happens in
discourse, its success can be measured by referring to linguistic changes
which reflect a shift from the dominant to the alternative story.94 Winslade
and Monk thus search for conversational moves which occur within "the
landscape of meaning," while weaving them into "the landscape of action." 95
They measure "unique outcomes" in terms of history telling, being present at
the mediation, meanings, thoughts, and other dimensions.96 They also call for
documentation of progress as part of the mediation process, and encourage
mediators to write letters to the parties to articulate their progress. 97
G. The Mediator's Role
The pragmatic model assumes that the mediator's role is to manage the
inter-subjective encounter of the conflict and to overcome the strategic and
cognitive biases of the parties, while adopting a process orientation and
applying the four principles of the Getting To Yes model.98 The mediator is a
problem solver and fits the image of a smart, sophisticated, pragmatic lawyer
who knows how to close a deal.99 These lawyers aspire to rational
management of the parties' needs and interests, and to achieve integrative
90 See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 94-95.
91 Id. at 248-51.
92 Bush & Folger, Transformative Mediation and Third Party Intervention: Ten
Hallmarks of Transformative Mediation Practice, 13 MEDIATION Q. 263, 275-76 (1996).
93 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 37-41.
9 4 Id. at 61-62.
95 Id. at 163-65.
9 6 1d. at 173-77.
9 7 Id. at 227-47.
9 8 FISHER & URY, supra note 17.
99 For reference to the pragmatic approach as corresponding with a lawyer's state of
mind, see ROGER FISHER, ELIZABETH KOPPELMAN, & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER,
BEYOND MACHIAVELLI 11-12 (1994).
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win-win solutions. They are considered objective, professional, and external
to the parties, and have the neutrality that enables them to balance the
parties' inter-subjective worlds.' 00
The transformative model envisions a therapist mediator whose role is to
help the parties reach transformation through listening and self-reflection.' 0'
The mediator is considered the most facilitating among the models, and thus
the transformative view is considered the "ideal type" of mediation.'0 2 It
follows the process orientation of mediation as introduced by Fuller. 10 3 The
mediator can be perceived as preparing the parties for direct negotiation,
which will take place "outside."' 104
Within the narrative approach, the mediator may be perceived as an
anthropologist with therapeutic sensitivities, or a therapist with a cultural or
perhaps legal perspective. This is the most theoretical model of mediation
and may not be applicable in some conflict situations, such as business
interactions or monetary disputes.10 5 The mediator encourages the parties to
question their exaggerated entitlement perceptions, and to replace their
taken-for-granted ideologies with new narratives that they choose. 10 6 The
mediator is a coauthor with the parties and uses writing as means of
transformation. The mediator is not considered neutral or "objective" under
this perception, and is expected to expose cultural biases when approaching
the parties.' 0 7 Operating through curiosity and deferral of judgment, the
mediator must also constantly question his or her own prejudice and
stereotypes. 08
100 See ALBERSTEIN, supra note 10, at ch. 8.
101 id. at ch. 9.
102 This conclusion can be inferred also from Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed
Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775 (1999). The author uses Bush and Folgers' relational emphasis
in their transformative mediation model as a paradigm for defining the kind of autonomy
which exists in mediation.
103 See Fuller, supra note 7, at 307.
104 See Bush & Folger, supra note 92, at 273.
105 See Alberstein, supra note 10, at ch. 11.
106 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 111-15.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 35-36, 51-54.
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H. Sequence
Fisher and Ury suggest basing their pragmatic negotiation on four
principles-which also constitute the stages of the integrative negotiation and
mediation processes. The mediation process includes: an opening session, the
shift from positions to interests, the shift from positions to generating options
through brainstorming, choice among options, and the construction of an
agreement.' 0 9 The four principles are:
1. Separate the people from the-problem. Fisher and Ury advise
negotiators to be soft on the people and hard on the problem, to
depersonalize, save face, and maintain the relationship.I10
2. Focus on interests, not positions. The anti-foundational assumption
of the "principled negotiation" approach is that positions in
negotiation veil the true "movers"-needs, desires, concerns, and
fears-the parties' interests. 111 Later approaches differentiate
between types of interests, some focusing on needs and values as the
key to understanding interests.11 2 An important stage in each
mediation session is the shift from positions to interests. 113
3. Invent options for mutual gains. After discovering the interests and
exploring them, the parties begin to invent options without
committing to any specific solution. 1 4 Maintaining a collaborative,
respectful atmosphere enables parties to brainstorm and generate
creative options to expand the pie before dividing it. Parties should
work on minimizing their differences and avoid premature judgment
or fixating on one solution in order to "expand the pie," create
alternatives, and construct a "bridge solution" to the problems they
encounter.
115
109 This can be inferred from the principled negotiation framework. See FISHER &
URY, supra note 17, at 10-14.
110Id. at 17-39.
11' Id. at 40-42.
112 See LEWICKI, supra note 25, at 122-23 (referring to 'Lax & Sebenius'
differentiation between interests).
113 See FISHER & URY, supra note 17, at 40-42.
114Id. at 56-80.
115 LEWICKI, supra note 25, at 128.
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4. Insist on using objective criteria. This last stage involves choosing
among the options and regulating the negotiation through the parties'
own enactment.11 6 They can choose a standard of fairness,
efficiency, science, or even law, and avoid the dominance battle.117
After choosing the objective criteria, the parties can frame their
agreement with the mediator and resolve the dispute.
The transformative approach can be perceived as preparation for a
straightforward problem-solving negotiation that will be performed
elsewhere. 1 8 It focuses on listening, reflecting, and enabling the parties to
expose emotions and deal with past events.1 19 The various dimensions of
empowerment and recognition described by Bush and Folger can be
interpreted as measuring the ability of the parties to separate the people from
the problem, acknowledge interests, invent options, and improve their
decisionmaking capacity. 120 In contrast to the pragmatic approach, which
focuses on forward-looking deal-making while managing the emotional
aspects through venting and "going out on the balcony," this model treats
emotions as rich signals of information that should be dealt with directly. 121
The process reaches tentative closures, and "success" can be marked when
the parties experience empowerment and recognition, and move from self-
embeddedness to strength and responsiveness. 122 The three primary patterns
of transformative mediation are:
1. Micro-focusing on parties' moves. The mediator keeps a responsive
posture and plans each move according to the prior moves of the
parties. ' 23
116 FISHER & URY, supra note 17, at 81-94.
117 Id. at85.
118 See ALBERSTEIN, supra note 10, at ch. 6.
119 See Bush & Folger, supra note 92.
120 See, BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 85-94 (describing the various
dimensions of empowerment and recognition). In the 2005 revised edition this
description is omitted and instead empowerment is described in more general terms. See
BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 20, at 75-77. Perhaps the omission reflects an interest in
detaching the transformative model from the pragmatic one.
121 Bush & Folger, supra note 92, at 271.
122 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 95-99.
123 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 192-94.
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2. Encouraging deliberation and choice-making. The mediator "helps
the parties clarify their needs and goals and reflect and deliberate
about options with a full awareness of their potentials and limits."'124
3. Fostering perspective-taking. Here, "[t]he mediator looks for
openings-places where one party can consider the other's
situation... from the other's perspective and where a more
positive ... view of the other might be entertained.' 125
Within the narrative perspective, the sequence begins with
"engagement," which establishes relationships and builds trust between the
parties. 126 At this stage, the mediator attends to the physical setting in which
the mediation is to take place, to the nonverbal behavior of the parties in
early interactions, and to the discursive positions to which the mediators and
the parties are called. 127 The process moves on to "deconstruct the conflict-
saturated story," trying to undermine the certainties on which the conflict
relies while emphasizing "elements that contradict the ongoing persistence of
the dispute, such as moments of agreement, cooperation, and mutual
respect."'1 28 The concluding stage of narrative mediation is "constructing the
alternative story," which includes "crafting alternative, more preferred story
lines" with the parties. 129 The demarcation between the stages is not neat, and
stages can occur simultaneously or in a different order. The prevalence of
writing is emphasized within this model, as in post-structural thought in
general, and the mediator writes letters for the parties summarizing each
session, trying to reflect on their progress and location within the
discourse. 130 The assumption is that the change in narratives, and the move to
alternative stories, will inevitably change "reality," which is only a projection
of the parties' narratives. 131
124Id. at 194.
125 Id. at 196.
126 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 62-72.
127 Id. at 62-70.
128 Id. at 72.
129 Id. at 83.
130 Letters and other documents produced during mediation can serve a variety of
purposes, according to Winslade and Monk, including acknowledgement, mapping the
influence of the problem, historicizing the problem, holding up unique outcomes to the
light, and other purposes. Id. at 233-44.
131 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 52-53.
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Chart I: Cultures of Mediation-Basic Concepts
Pragmatic Transformative Narrative
Mediation Mediation Mediation
Separate * Relationally- * Socially-
Perception individuals embedded constructed
of Parties * Rational o Ethically- * Multiple identities
maximizers committed
* Satisfaction of 6 A rift in the * A closure of a
complementary relational texture of dominant discourse
needs the parties of conflict
e Masked by the * An opportunity for * A clash of
Conflict declaration of moral growth in two entitlements based
Definition positions (a dimensions- sometimes on
formula empowerment and unearned privilege or
influenced by recognition a conservative
American 9 A positive notion ideology
pragmatism) of conflict
* Problem- * Improving the * A shift from the
solving based on relational context of dominant discourses
principles the dispute of conflict to
Process A search for * A process of alternative discourses
Definition win-win solutions strengthening the self of mediationbased on interests and improving the * An educational
or needs response to others process from taken-
for-granted positions
to chosen ones
o Liberalism * Relational * Postmodemism
Worldview 9 Economic- * Critique of e Social
utilitarian liberalism constructionism
9 A Pareto e Relational growth * Alternative
optimal solution * Empowerment and narrative of
Definition * Addressing all recognition in any relationship
of Success involving interests dimension 9 "Unique
outcomes" which
reflect weaving of
meaning and actions
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* Efficient * Empowering the * Co-authoring the
rational parties and improving alternative narrative
management of their conflict with the parties
Role of the interests and needs management skills * Offering
Mediator * An inter- 9 Enabling the interpretive reading
subjective balance parties to solve their while remaining
of inherently conflict "outside the curious and assuming
biased perceptions room" a storytelling position
e Listening to 9 Listening * Engagement
positions * Reflecting * Deconstructing the
* De- 9 Summarizing conflict-saturated
personalization e Moving from story
Sequence e A shift from weakness and a self- * Constructing the
positions to embedded situation alternative story
interests to strength and
* Inventing responsiveness
options
* Agreement
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIVISION
A. Introduction
The following section will explore a few implications of the suggested
intellectual map of cultures of mediation on some prevailing discussions
within the mediation discourse. The lack of reflection on the various possible
intellectual foundations for mediation may result in a limited picture of the
problems at stake. An analysis from one intellectual perspective may collide
with one from a different intellectual tradition, and a true dialogue between
parties can develop only after exposing the inherent cultural bias that
characterizes their encounter. Moreover, sometimes the mere presentation of
a few distinct perspectives may enrich our understanding of a debate,
presenting it in its multiplicity.
B. Imbalance of Power
One of the most familiar challenges for the development of mediation
practice and, in fact, for the growth of the entire field of conflict resolution, is
the implication these processes have on power imbalances. What are the
consequences of introducing a process that aspires to settlement and
encourages collaborative negotiation into a social environment which may
[Vol. 22:2 20071
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include inherent economical, sociological, or psychological gaps? How can a
process that assumes freedom of contracts and self-determination address
situations which are inherently unequal and imbalanced? How can an ADR
system, as it becomes more common and public, preserve the procedural
safeguards and the substantial formal protections for weak groups in society?
These concerns have accompanied mediation since its birth and were
specifically emphasized during the foundational and early stages of the
development of the ADR movement during the 1980s.
A group of legal scholars, mainly from the center and left of the political
legal academic map, viewed mediation as an effort to privatize justice and to
nullify the achievements of the Human Rights Movement. 132 Since a culture
of rights promotes progress through consciousness-raising and law making,
the call for settlement and ADR was perceived as contrary to progress. 33
Calling people to reconcile and reach harmony in a world filled with
oppression and injustices was thus portrayed by some critics as motivated by
conservative sentiments. 134 Only public promotion of justice can help weak
groups, according to this view, and the call to mediate might prevent these
groups from developing political consciousness or from reaching courts in
order to protect their rights. 135 The most famous legal scholar to raise this
argument in its most familiar and provocative formula was Owen Fiss in his
well-known 1980s article, Against Settlement.136 In his article, Fiss rejects
132 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); see also, Penelope
E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L.
REV. 441 (1992); Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889 (1991); Richard Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed-
Recent Books About the Deformalization Movement, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 145
(1988); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359; Harry T. Edwards,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986);
Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545 (1991); Michele G. Hermann, The Dangers of ADR: A Three-Tiered System of
Justice, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117 (1989-1990); David Luban, Bargaining and
Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal Justice, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
397 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991);
Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights
Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1987); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of
Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443.
13 3 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 124 (1983).
134Id.
135 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 22-24.
136 Fiss, supra note 132.
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the call to develop ADR programs and to encourage settlements by
emphasizing the public value of litigation as a way to sharpen political values
and to politicize private relationships. 137 Law is not about neighbors'
squabbles, says Fiss; thus, settling legal disputes as if they are private
encounters prevents society from promoting justice through value
discussions. 138
In terms of the intellectual map offered, Fiss' writing already represents a
deviation from classical liberalism, though he does not explicitly
acknowledge the influence of Neo-Marxist thought upon his arguments. 139
As part of the group of scholars defined as "the new public law movement,"
Fiss is inspired by "the interpretive turn" 140 and by postmodemist thought,
and he incorporates some of the critiques offered by these intellectual
movements into his writings. He perceives adjudication as "the social process
by which judges give meaning to our public values,"' 141 defines adjudication
as "interpretation,"' 142 and is inspired by Brown v. Board of Education143 as a
137Id. at 1073-76.
138Id.
139 For an accurate characterization of the political theoretical foundations of Fiss's
group of legal intellectuals, see William Eskridge Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1990).
[Tihe "center" chosen by the New Public Law is a distinctly postmodern center; the
New Public Law is one manifestation of a new quasi-cultural social form that is
associated with the appearance of postmodernism as a presence in American
intellectual life. In other words, the postmodernism condition is constituted, not only
by its radical avant garde-CLS in law, for example, or deconstruction, in literary
criticism-but also by a particular, recognizable attempt to moderate and stabilize,
to constitute a center sophisticated enough to comprehend the postmodern stance but
nevertheless reformist enough to believe that it doesn't make all that much
difference after all.
Id at 789. In other words: There is a critical pressure on the public law movement
scholars to make them adopt an interpretive perspective, but there is also a stronger
aspiration by them to preserve a constructive and objective perception of the work of
judges and the law in general.
140 Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in
Jurisprudence, 76 IOWA L. REV. 661 (1991); see also Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive
Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1989).
Moore defines "interpretivism" as "my label for a view that denies either sense or
practical significance to any metaphysics (be it realist, idealist, or skeptical) because of
some supposed need for 'interpretation."'
141 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
142 Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
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paradigm of justice and progressivism.144 His location within this intellectual
legal context explains his interest in defending weak groups only through
court decisions and his reluctance toward promoting any privatization of
conflicts that have so far been handled in the political public medium. Other
progressive or liberal scholars like Trina Grillo and David Luban express
equivalent responses to ADR, and suggest that mediation can oppress
women 145 or create erosion of the public sphere. 146
The imbalance-of-power argument, in its strongest version, reflects a
critique of liberalism and of the private-public demarcation of the
mainstream ADR movement. 147 It does not simply represent a concern for
weak individuals in a private conflict, but instead perceives the conflict as a
social interaction that will reinforce structural imbalances if not treated in
public terms. 148 The response to this strong version reflects the intellectual
location of each model of mediation.
The Pragmatic Model: The pragmatic model is founded on classical
liberalism, assumes a classical notion of contract law, and accepts
individualism as the prevailing paradigm. 149 Under such a perception, no
acknowledgement of the strong imbalance argument is possible because
people sharing the pragmatic worldview are blind to the Neo-Marxist critique
which points to the repressed legal consciousness in ADR.150 According to
this culture of conflict resolution, each legal dispute is a private matter and
addressing the imbalance between parties is not a political concern, but a
pragmatic one that should be addressed by offering new tools and evaluation
mechanisms for each individual case. 151 In this spirit, Frank Sander-
considered to be the founder of the ADR movement-responds to Fiss'
argument in Against Settlement. Sander suggests that a seminar be conducted
143 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144 For an indication of Fiss's focus on Brown as an inspirational case see Fiss,
supra note 141.
145 Grillo, supra note 132.
146 David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619 (1995).
14 7 See ALBERSTEIN, supra note 10, at ch. 4.
148 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 22-23.
149 See the discussion of worIdviews in mediation, supra Part II.B of this article.
15 0 See ALBERSTEIN, supra note 10, at ch. 4.
151 F. Sander & S. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide
to Selecting an ADR Procedure, in STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (1999).
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to discuss the implications of ADR programs on weak parties, 152 and ignores
the strong ideological claims in Fiss' Against Settlement. This response
reflects a basic pragmatic gesture, typical of mediation, which tries to
deconstruct big positional claims and examine them in context. 153 It also
reflects the worldview of a modem liberal individualist who cannot grasp the
postmodern claims and the appeal to consciousness. 154
In fact, the liberal-pragmatic response of mediation to imbalance of
power can be divided into three levels:
1. The contractual account: In terms of classic contract law, the
insistence on informed consent is meant to ensure that parties are
empowered enough to know what they are signing or giving up. 155
Mediators are supposed to monitor and control manipulation and
abuse while working on the private level of the singular disputes.
They are supposed to reject settlements which reflect genuine
meetings of the wills. According to a classical liberal view, because
oppression is only a consequence of private circumstances, dealing
with it can focus on the private elements of contract law and
informed consent without referring to law or ideology. 156
2. The pragmatic account: A basic idea of Getting To Yes, which
reflects deep sentiment in pragmatic thinking, is to turn what seems
to be a power struggle between opposing positions into a
collaborative deal based on interests. Within this sequence, weak
parties can avoid submission by insisting on objective criteria and
working to strengthen alternatives to the agreement (Best Alternative
to a Negotiated Agreement or BATNA). 157 In the ADR literature,
some projects focus, as Sander suggested, 158 on empirical evidence
in order to evaluate the effect of ADR on weak groups. Other articles
152 Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law School
Curriculum: Opportunities and Obstacles, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 232 (1984).
"Similarly some of the recent works critical of the alternatives movement could be used
for a searching examination of the impact of noncourt processes on the disadvantaged-
whether, in the parlance of the critics, these processes constitutes a form of 'second-class
justice' and serve to coopt the poor." Id.
153 See discussion infra Part IV.A of this article.
154 See ALBERSTEIN, supra note 10, at ch. 4.
155 See generally Nolan-Haley, supra note 102.
1 5 6 See ALBERSTEIN, supra note 10, ch. 4.
15 7 See FISHER & URY, supra note 17, at 177.
158 See supra text to note 152.
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offer guidelines and measures to overcome the imbalance
problems. 159
3. The ethical account: The more substantive response to the imbalance
claim attempts to acknowledge it, while constructing ethical
principles that aim to address this situation as a private case
demanding mediators' intervention. The ethical standard of
"fairness," as discussed in the ADR literature, requires mediators to
empower weak parties (as a part of empowering all parties to the
extent that circumstances allow), and to enhance the efficient
administration of justice 160 and procedural fairness. While litigation
has built in procedural protections for the weak and strong alike, as a
process, it cannot shift the parties' inherent endowments anymore
than mediation can.
The Transformative Model: As mentioned above, this model incorporates
some critique of liberalism and introduces a relational scheme to address the
situation of conflict. 161 In fact, one of the main incentives for the
development of this model was the need to offer a better response to the
challenge offered by the imbalance argument. 162 In Bush and Folger's
writings, this challenge is called The Oppression Story, and is presented as
one of the dominant stories defining the field of mediation. 163 "The
Oppression Story," according to their analysis, claims that "mediation has
turned out to be a dangerous instrument for increasing the power of the
strong to take advantage of the weak,"'164 and in a stronger version "the
overall effect of the movement has been to neutralize social justice gains
achieved by the civil rights, women's, and consumer's movements, among
others."'1 65 Efforts to address the Oppression Story have affected the practice,
according to Bush and Folger, and have induced mediators to forget one of
159 Carrie Menkei-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995). The author
offers key questions regarding the limits of parties' consent to settlement and provides
preliminary guidelines to evaluate the public aspects of disputes.
160 See, e.g., Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 909, 922 (1998); Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, 1 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 29
(2000).
161 See discussion supra note 18, Part II.B.
162 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 17, at 22-27.
163 Id. at 22-24.
164 Id. at 22.
165 Id. at 23.
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the basic promises of mediation. Mediators have become paternalistic; their
intervention has become too invasive and judgmental, and their aspiration to
balance efficiency and rights protection 166 has resulted in a very invasive
practice lacking the initial ethos which had promised self-determination and
empowerment. 167
The better way to cope with the imbalance argument, according to Bush,
is to emphasize the distinct values behind mediation, which are different
from those of adjudication and do not include redistribution and protection of
weak groups in society. 168 Adjudication should be considered the best
process to protect rights, while mediation should be allowed to promote its
own internal values of empowerment and recognition. This means that
mediators should not aspire to protect weak parties and should stay clear of
expressing any judgment or defending any right. 169 Within the mediation
session, where the intervention takes place only "in the room" 170 and the
relational level of the conflict is the only one that counts, no reference to
legal rights should be made, unless it is made by the parties themselves, and
no aspiration to external balance of powers between parties should be
encouraged. The parties alone are supposed to determine their rights and
duties. "The parties know best," as one transformative mediation hallmark
states. 171 In an adjudication process, the social dimension of the relationship
will be addressed and the decision in the case will reflect broad public policy.
In a mediation process, parties are free to take their relationships in any
direction by adopting any rules, legal or others, with the goal that they
experience empowerment and recognition and enjoy moral growth in so
16 6 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and
Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REv.
253,259-60 (1989).
167 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 33-40.
168 Bush, supra note 166, at 259-66.
169 Bush & Folger, supra note 92, at 266-69.
Awareness, control, and suspension of judgment thus constitute a clear
hallmark of transformative practice. The mediator is helped in this habit of practice
by another kind of awareness that also flows from the transformative framework.
That is, the mediators constantly remain aware that, no matter how much
information is revealed, they actually know very little for sure about the parties,
their situations, and their lives as a whole-and immeasurably less than the parties
themselves.
Id. at 268.
170 One of the principles of transformative mediation is that "The action is 'in the
room': remaining focused on the here and now of the conflict interaction." Id. at 273.
17 1 1d. at 268.
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doing.172 The relational mediator, described by Bush and Folger,173 who tries
to promote "ethics of care," is not interested in redistribution or in legal
rights-all of which reflect the same old paradigm of "ethics of justice."
Instead, the mediator aspires to operate under a new paradigm in moral
thinking which carries its own epistemology and measures. 174 Imbalance is a
concept that does not fit the vision of ethics of care. 175
To summarize, the transformative model addresses the imbalance of
power by denying it altogether and by portraying an extreme private image
of mediation as based on relationship and care, without any concern for
rights or social consequences. Mediation models that follow the
transformative model and adopt a relational-communitarian 76 perception of
parties, such as "humanist mediation"'177 and "restorative justice,"'178 repeat
the same mode of response to the imbalance of power argument, ignoring it
or perceiving it as an expression of an inferior stage of perception within
liberal thinking.
The Narrative Model: The narrative model provides a postmodern
response to the imbalance of power challenge.' 79 Winslade and Monk
declare that the model does not seek to efface power, to equalize it, to
empower the parties, or even to accept resistance to mediation because of the
172 See Michal Alberstein, Negotiating for Justice, Fighting for Law: The Dialectic
of Promoting and Settling Disputes in the Current Global Era, 31 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y
45 (2004).
173 Bush & Folger, supra note 92.
174 See Alberstein, supra note 172, at 68-73.
175 Id.
176 For a definition of Philosophical Communitarianism see Wikipedia,
Communitarianism,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communitarianism#Philosophicalcommunitarianism (last
visited Nov. 5, 2006).
Philosophical communitarianism considers classical liberalism to be ontologically
and epistemologically incoherent, and opposes it on those grounds. Unlike classical
liberalism, which construes communities as originating from the voluntary acts of
pre-community individuals, it emphasizes the role of the community in defining and
shaping individuals. Communitarians believe that the value of community is not
sufficiently recognized in liberal theories of justice.
Id.
177 Umbreit, supra note 43.
178 See ZEHR, supra note 44, at 182. "Crime then is at its core a violation of a person
by another person, a person who himself or herself may be wounded. It is a violation of
the just relationship that would exist between individuals." Id.
179 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 47-51.
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existence of power relations. 180 These commentators use Foucault's notion of
power 181 to address questions of imbalance in mediation, and thus oppose
viewing it as a commodity that can be held by one side or another. 182 Power,
according to them, "pervades the entire social body."' 183 Since all social life
is viewed as a network of power relations, and these relations are always
capable of being reviewed, it does not make sense to speak of a party as
lacking any power. The notion of empowerment is also problematic, since it
relies on the commodity metaphor of power. 184 Instead of balancing between
the parties as the pragmatic model suggests, or ignoring their imbalance
while treating them as fully competent and equal as the transformative model
suggests, the narrative model offers to perceive power as in constant play and
as given to refrainng and resistance within the mediation process:
Narrative mediators would rather talk about how people can take up
opportunities to resist the operation of power in their lives. Such mediators
start from the assumption that this is always possible. Equality of power
may never be achievable, or even desirable, because it is a notion that
brings us back into an individualistic, commodity-based reading of power
relations. Rather, the power relations that exist might be viewed as the
ongoing product of struggles and contests. 185
In adopting this post-structural notion of power, the narrative model
provides the strongest response to imbalances in society; it claims a
possibility for even the most oppressed and defeated person to "demonstrate
some level of psychological resistance to an oppressive or constraining
circumstance."' 186 Once we acknowledge the imbalance critique and perceive
it as an invitation "to a particular conversational pattern' 187 within
mediation, the power relation can shift and change following that
18°Id. at 118.
181 MICHEL FOUCAULT, PowER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRIrINGS, 1972-1977 (C. Gordon, ed., C. Gordon, L. Marchall, J. Mepham & K. Soper
trans., 1980); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
182 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 51.
183 Id.
184Id. at 51.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 118.
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conversational pattern, and a new power dynamic may be produced.' 88 This
can be true even in situations of violence and fundamentalism. 189
C. Mandatory Mediation
Another debated subject within the ADR field is the question of whether
mediation or other dispute resolution processes aside from adjudication
should become mandatory. Is it justified to refer divorcing parents to
mediation when debating custody of their children? 190 Can parties be forced
to attend mediation as a preliminary process in order to promote efficiency
and to clear court dockets? 19 1 Can workers be forced to participate in an
alternative process such as mediation before applying to labor court? 192 All
these questions go deeply into the roots of ADR philosophy, and they
become even more important as the institutionalization of ADR grows and
develops. The question of whether compelling people to participate in an
ADR process is legitimate goes back to basic questions about the underlying
perceptions of the discourse, and analyzing this debate in terms of the models
suggested here might contribute to the existing discussion.
The idea of choice and self-determination is foundational to the field of
conflict resolution and is a source of inspiration for the ADR movement. 193
Some say that the call for mediation as the preferred dispute resolution
mechanism 194 reflects a return to the old belief in freedom of contract, which
188 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 217-26.
189 Id.
190 See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 132, at 1549-50 (discussing the opposition, to
mandatory mediation in divorce cases).
191 Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better
Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 93, 133 (2002).
192 Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the
New Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11 (2005).
193 For an elaborate discussion of the principle and the way it should be
implemented in mediation see Nolan-Haley, supra note 102, at 787-93.
194 The centrality of mediation as the prevailing dispute resolution form is reflected
in many ways, including the familiar basic formula of Fitting the Forum to the Fuss by
Goldberg and Sander, which provides a guide for selecting an ADR procedure.
According to the authors' chart, the process which scores the best results in achieving
most of the goals of parties in a conflict, and which is capable of overcoming most of the
impediments to settlement is mediation. See Sander & Goldberg, supra note 151, at 291-
95.
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was challenged during the twentieth century in contract law. 195 Others
emphasize the conservative elements of returning to consensual processes
and ascribe ideological motives to the ADR movement. 196 From a slightly
different direction, the ADR focus is considered a kind of "new
formalism"'197 which elevates mediation over adjudication and arbitration,
just as old formalists celebrated contract and marginalized tort. 198 In any
case, it can be argued that one of the main inspirations for the development
of the ADR movement and for the thriving of mediation within it is the
return to ideas of control, autonomy, and self determination.
Philosophically speaking, what do these concepts mean? Can a person
really experience "self-determination," and is "real autonomy" possible at
all? One of the more passionate and polemic debates during the twentieth
century focused mainly on the critique and reevaluation of notions such as
"autonomy," "self-determination," "private," and "consent." 199 Starting with
Nietzsche, and going back even to pre-Socratic thinking, challenges to
western notions of autonomy have promoted a more heteronomic and
connected image of the self.200 The human self is considered to be
determined by many outside forces within new perceptions of the self; the
identity is multiple, interdependent, and sometimes dispersed and challenged.
Feminist scholars have expressed this understanding in our era through
expressions such as "the private is public," "self in relationship,"20' and "the
relational self." In mediation and negotiation studies, these debates have not
195 PATRICK SALIM ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979);
Marc Galanter, Contract in Court: or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to
Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 577; Mark Pettit Jr., Freedom,
Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall," 79 B.U. L. REv. 263 (1999).
196 See AUERBACH, supra note 133; Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the
Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute
Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL 1 (1993); Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion-the
Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 269 (1988).
197 Austin Sarat, The 'New Formalism' in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21
LAW & Soc'y REv. 695, 696 (1988).
198 Id. at 705.
199 LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., New York University Press
1984).
200 For discussions of different perception of identities, see Isaiah Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (Oxford University Press
1969); Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883
(1989); and Fred Dallmayr, The Politics of Nonidentity, Adorno, Postmodernism, and
Edward Said, 25 POLITICAL THEORY 33 (1997).
201 Carol Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self in
Relationship, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN 3-19 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988).
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been explicitly discussed, and thus, some incorporation of these new ideas
has been accomplished unsystematically and in a contradictory way.
In broad terms, the three forms of mediation presented in this Paper may
address mandatory mediation along the lines of the worldviews of liberalism,
the critique of liberalism and relational values, and postmodernism.
Pragmatic mediation, which assumes an old liberal notion of freedom of
contract and self-determination, might emphasize the dichotomy between
substance and process and claim that an obligation to mediate or negotiate is
not an obligation to agree to substantial conditions. 20 2 Thus, freedom of
contract is not affected and mediation norms are not breached.
Transformative mediation emphasizes the relational aspects of
mediation, and thus, the contract ideal and autonomy considerations are not
its main concerns. Nevertheless, transformative mediation emphasizes self-
determination and calls for an improved decisionmaking process to be
employed by parties in mediation. 20 3 A deep belief in empowerment and self-
determination, and a perception of consent not only as a formal process,
requires an active agreement to each stage in the mediation process, and thus
goes against the imposition of a mandatory mediation process. In a
paradoxical way, a model that is based on the critique of liberalism, and
although a possible application of it can justify mandatory mediation,20 4 it
202 See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical
Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 565 (1997). According to the article, there is little support for
concerns about pressures to accept unfair settlements in mandatory mediation.
203 See, e.g., Bush & Folger, supra note 92, at 263 (defining mediation according to
the hallmarks of transformative mediation).
204 Michaela Keet, The Evolution of Lawyers' Roles in Mandatory Mediation: A
Condition of Systemic Transformation, 68 SASK. L. REV. 313, 320-21 (2005).
For the most part, theorists have focused on the individual dimensions of
transformation: the potential for collaborative processes to result in transformation
for individuals or, in Lederach's case, communities who are participants in that
conflict; and the potential for conflict, properly handled, to transform people and
communities in positive ways, resulting in growth, increased understanding and
awareness, and the rehabilitation of relationships. The analysis presented in this
article shifts the attention from moral questions such as the impact of the mediation
process on personal growth, to systemic questions such as the impact of the
mediation program on the institution of civil justice which surrounds it. Without
assuming that mediation is itself functioning in a peace-oriented or morally
transformative way, I will explore the proposition that an adversarial-based civil
justice system can be transformed through the introduction of an interest-based
dispute resolution program. Mandatory mediation can have an enormous impact on
individuals and communities involved in conflict. However, one of its largest
legacies may be its impact on the way the civil justice system operates.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
seems, in reality, to promote the most extreme perception of the autonomy of
parties in mediation by emphasizing the notions of empowerment and self-
determination. 20 5 In other words, at a deep level, the transformative model is
inspired by a liberalist "bias" in favor of empowerment by insisting on the
non-paternalistic passive role of the mediator and on the strength of self as
preceding the care for other.
Finally, the narrative model takes a unique approach to mandatory
mediation because the whole idea of consent and contract is doubted by it as
an old liberal notion. 20 6 Aspiring to the alternative story while attempting to
deconstruct the dominant one fits together with a diffused perception of a self
that is reconstructed with each stage of the process according to the changing
narrative. 20 7 The party who enters the mandatory mediation can transform
and re-emerge, the party's discursive existence being a function of the
setting, the context, and the current exchange between the parties. Under this
perception, there is no objection to mandatory mediation because there is no
inherent or coherent value in defending values of autonomy and self-
determination. People are never fully agents, but also are not always subject
to external conditions. Instead, they should be seen as creatures of language
and discourse who can transform along with the mandatory mediation
discourse. Thus, mandating parties to mediate requires new skills for
mediators,20 8  and a social constructionist perspective will resist
"internalizing conception of motivation.., in favor of a definition of
motivation as a 'state of readiness' produced in ... the conversations in
which the mediation process is being discussed. '20 9 A different question to
ask is whether people who oppose mediation are emotionally and
intellectually ripe to experience some of the deep processes of reeducation
and transformation aspired to by narrative mediation. However, this does not
affect the principled opinion that will generally be in favor of mandatory
mediation due to the elasticity and constructability of the human self.
Id.
205 See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 102, at 789-91. Although the author defines
the idealized vision of autonomy in mediation as grounded in relational and communal
values, she continues to examine the conditions for informed consent according to classic
liberal individualistic terms.
206 This perception can be inferred from the postmodernist worldview which
inspires the narrative mediation model.
207 WINSLADE & MoNK, supra note 21, at 209-11.
208 WINSLADE & MoNK, supra note 21, at 66.
209 Id. at 210.
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D. Legal Advice in Mediation
What is the role of legal rules within mediation? What is the relationship
between law and mediation in general? Should a lawyer inform the parties of
the legal situation? Should the lawyer make sure that their agreement
complies with the law? How should a mediator respond to requests to give a
legal opinion? Should some cases be referred only to lawyer-mediators, and
what is the overall relationship between law and mediation? The three
models offer diverse answers to these questions, which are fundamental to
ADR discussions and reflect the intellectual horizons from which they arise.
The pragmatic model gives the familiar straightforward response to the
questions by defining, first of all, the role of legal rules within the problem-
solving process. In Fisher and Ury's Getting to Yes, the only reference to
legal rules is made during the last stage of choosing between the creative
options. This is the stage which applies the principle of "insist on objective
criteria." Legal rules are not initially relevant to go beyond positions,
separate people from feelings, or create options. They become relevant only
as one among other sets of objective criteria which may be used by the
parties to divide the pie at the last stage. Such a limited role does not require
a full legal career or education. In most of the cases, obtaining external legal
advice might provide the information needed for the comprehension of the
objective legal criteria at stake. The evaluative process itself might in fact
jeopardize the whole creative process of problem-solving, and some scholars
claim that, where mediators take the arbitral role of evaluating the process,
the process should not be called mediation at all. 210 The Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators211 repeats this position by emphasizing the facilitative
role of mediation.212 Still, from another perspective, the pragmatic model can
210See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 89, at 399-409; Lela P. Love &
Kimberlee K. Kovatch, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes Rather than One Eclectic
Process, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 295, 296-98; Kimberlee K. Kovatch and Lela P. Love,
Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998);
Leonard L. Riskin, Who Decides What? Rethinking the Grid of Mediator Orientations, 22
DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003 [hereinafter Rethinking the Grid]; Leonard L. Riskin,
Retiring and Replacing the Grid of Mediator Orientations, 21 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH
COST LIT1G. 69 (2003); Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old
Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003).
211 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05 .pdf.
212 See, for example, the preface to the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators:
"Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party-a mediator-facilitates the
resolution of a dispute by promoting voluntary agreement (or "self-determination") by
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conceptually allow mediations with more legal orientation when the subject
at stake cannot be resolved effectively without proper legal knowledge. Such
is often the case in environmental mediation,213 divorce mediations that
require some familiarity with the law, and conflicts over legal matters,
particularly when the mediation takes place under the auspices of a court.
The transformative model does not require legal advice in any stage of
the mediation. The relational and therapeutic character of Bush and Folger's
model, and the equivalent version of victim-offender mediation or truth
committees, aims to detach mediation from the distributional pragmatic
focus, and to make it a spiritual and emotional experience which will
promote interpersonal relationships. While there is doubt as to whether such
a role can be fulfilled by lawyers at all,214 it is clear that legal advice, even if
only providing legal knowledge, is forbidden, and no exclusivity is given to
lawyers in handling such mediations.
The narrative model returns in some sense to an acknowledgment of the
role of law within the conflict, but it does so by adopting a different notion of
law than the one adopted by the pragmatic model. Formal legal rules or
principles are not the concern of the narrative mediator who can be an
anthropologist, sociologist, or a philosophic intellectual. Still, the deeper
senses of law as providing ideologies, and especially as constructing
perceptions of entitlements, are very interesting to the contemporary
mediator. Deconstructing ideological narratives and perceptions of reality is
a manner of performing the highest function of law in society-amelioration
through education.215 The narrative mediator thus perceives the process as
the parties to the dispute." MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § 1 cmt.
(2005). [S]elf determination: "The mediator may provide information about the process,
raise issues, and help parties explore options. The primary role of the mediator is to
facilitate a voluntary resolution of a dispute. Parties shall be given the opportunity to
consider all proposed options." Id.
213 See Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem, in MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 110 (2005); see also Joseph B. Stulberg, Symposium: Facilitative
Versus Evaluation Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 985 (1997).
2 14 See, e.g., Mellisa L. Nelken, Negotiation and Psychoanalysis: If I'd Wanted to
Learn about Feelings, I Wouldn't Have Gone to Law School, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 420
(1996).
215 For discussions of the law as consisting of three faces, see Steven D. Smith,
Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 68 (1991). See also Clark Freshman,
Privatizing Same-Sex Marriage Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: Community
Enhancing v. Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1687 (1997) (proposing
a community-enabling mediation process which "enables individuals to make informed
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being located within political and legal contexts, but views these contexts as
the ideologies underlying the law. The approach toward the debate over
providing formal legal information or legal advice would be to oppose any
reduction that might jeopardize the potential narrative transformation
between the parties. Legal determinations will be the natural consequences of
a successful process, but remaining on the legal level or attributing too much
significance to it is no process at all. Thus, lawyers should develop cultural
and theoretical sensitivities to law, while non-lawyers should aspire to gain
some legal sensitivity, but the main process occurs at the level of the
relationship and underlying ideologies.
E. Confidentiality in Mediation
The original promise of mediation, as phrased by the pragmatic model,
has emerged as the return to the private contract and to self-determination.
Parties were referred to facilitated negotiations outside of the courtroom, and
information regarding their bargaining processes was considered confidential
and private. Following this assumption, many mediation codes and the basic
model of mediation repeated the principle of confidentiality. 216 The
pragmatic model, which is based on a contract model, assumes that liberal
parties support this rule and promote it. Confidentiality of negotiations over
settlement terms is efficient, and exclusions are allowed only when the costs
are high to preserve this rule and require an exception, such as in cases of
crimes that can be avoided or when there is need to prove professional
misconduct or malpractice. 217 Some, however, claim that even the need to
choices about the kinds of communities they value and what weight, if any, to give to the
norms such individuals may associate with that community." This "public" notion of
mediation illustrates one of its functions as helping to internalize norms and public
values.).
216 The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators provides that:
The reasonable expectations of the parties with regard to confidentiality shall
be met by the mediator. The parties' expectations of confidentiality depend on the
circumstances of the mediation and any agreements they may make. A mediator
shall not disclose any matter that a party expects to be confidential unless given
permission by all parties or unless required by law or other public policy.
See Symposium, Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 50
J. Disp. RESOL. 95, 125 (1995).
217 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6 (2001) ("Exception to privilege"). For a
discussion of the contradictions between the confidentiality rule and the misconduct
duties, see Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable
Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality
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make settlements more "public" in terms of the social sphere might justify
more publicity of mediation agreements. 218
The transformative model has "less to hide" in terms of its internal
principles. If most of the process occurs on the relational level and involves a
therapeutic process of empowerment and recognition, the protection it
requires is more from the professional therapeutic aspect of therapy, and less
in the sense of legal bargaining confidentiality. Because this model aspires to
go beyond efficiency and to promote the moral aspect of mediation, it will be
more reluctant to make exceptions to the confidentiality rule in cases where
such exceptions are required for efficiency purposes.
Narrative mediation begins by emphasizing the social aspect of the
human experience, and insists on deconstructing the image of the individual
as a choice-making stable unit of analysis.219 Individual experiences are
consequences of discursive practices, and thus, focusing on rights and
confidentiality rules is meaningless and distracting. "Documenting change"
is thus an important aspect of the process of constructing an alternative
story.220 Coauthoring written documents is "part of the mediation process,
not just a functional record of the process." 221 The parties and the mediator
should exchange narratives in a free and open space, and part of the
coauthorship in the mediation should include the written notes of the
mediator and his letter to the parties.222 Writing, under a post-structural
perception, has prevalence as to constructing reality and overcoming the
obsession of Western metaphysics with presence. 223
and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU. L. REv. 715. For a
discussion whether uniformity in mediation confidentiality rules is required, see Ellen E.
Deason, Reply: The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish
Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 79 (2001).
218 See David Luban, supra note 146; David Luban, Legal Ethics: Limiting Secret
Settlements by Law, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHics 125 (1999).
219 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 44-47.
2 2 0 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 90.
221 Id. at 91.
222 Id. at 227-47.
2 2 3 JACQUEs DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravotry Spivak trans., The
Johns Hopkins University Press 1976) (1967).
358
[Vol. 22:2 2007]
CULTURES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Chart II: Cultures of Mediation: Im lications of the Division
Pragmatic Transformative Narrative
Mediation Mediation Mediation
* A private * Deferral of * Conflict is a
contract judgment power struggle
a Imbalance * Parties will treat based on
exists in the imbalance only if entitlements
positions level they choose to do so and ideologies
Imbalance of e Imbalance 9 Mediation is * Mediation
Power and Social monitored from private and does not educates the
Context the outside aim at redistribution parties to more
through advanced
"fairness" entitlement
perceptions
* Self- * Strengthening the 9 Refusing
determination decisionmaking mediation at the
contradicts a power of the parties entrance point,
mandatory requires voluntary while
process choice throughout occupying one
Mandatory o Differentiatin the entire process subject position,
Mediation g between does not entail
entering the the same
process response while
(mandatory) and reconstituted
conducting it again at a later
(voluntary) point in time in
the conflict
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Legal Advice
1 1 r
* Legal advice
has a limited role
as one source of
objective criteria
* In some
conflicts legal
knowledge
should be
required
o Relationship is at
the core of the
conflict and legal
advice is irrelevant
for addressing that
aspect
* Cultural
knowledge and
critique of
ideology are
more crucial
than the
knowledge of
legal rules,
though there is
relevance to the
deep principles
of the law
e Settlement e Mediation 9 Written
negotiations meetings are narrative of the
should be confidential as mediation is
confidential for therapeutic sessions open before the
pragmatic parties and its
Confidentiality reasons exchange is part
of the
coauthorship of
the process
IV. CULTURES OF MEDIATION: COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES
A. Commonalities
As the previous sections have aimed to demonstrate, mediation can be
practiced by using diverse languages, different images of the human, various
definitions of conflict, and a range of metaphors. Mediators can search for
efficient and optimal outcomes (the pragmatic model), psychological
strengthening and growth (the transformative model), and might even aspire
to the transformation of the socially constructed parties of the conflict (the
narrative model). In spite of the variations which characterize the distinct
intellectual foundations that inspire mediation, the claim here is that a
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distinct language of mediation can be traced through all models. 224 Central
elements remain unique for each mediation practice and can be phrased as
the "universal language of mediation. '225 These are the elements that
differentiate mediation from any other form of bargaining for settlement and
which locate it as a unique profession existing between therapy and law. 226
The unique elements of the language of mediation are: process emphasis, an
underlying hidden layer, emotions acknowledgement, and constructive
positive intervention.
1. Process Emphasis
The relationship between mediation and process orientation was
acknowledged in Fuller's declaration that mediation "is all process no
structure." 227 Under the pragmatic perception of mediation, the initial
incentive for developing a new style of negotiation relates to entering a
second order negotiation over the process itself:
The second negotiation concerns how you will negotiate the substantive
question: by soft positional bargaining, by hard positional bargaining, or by
some other method. This second negotiation is a game about a game-a
"meta game." 228
The recognition of the futility of distributive bargaining and of the
useless position struggle that characterizes the substantive negotiation game
calls for a negotiation over process, which results in devising a "principles
based negotiation." 229 Within this problem-solving framework, process is
regulated in an explicit way and requires attention and training.
The transformative model emerges as a critique of the problem-solving
framework's overemphasis on substance and efficiency, and offers to
emphasize procedural justice over substantive elements in conducting
224 See also ALBERSTEIN, supra note 10, at ch. 6.
225 Id.
226 For the debate over the definition of mediation and the questions whether it
includes evaluative process in search of settlements, see Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K.
Kovatch, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather than One Eclectic Process, 2000
J. DIsp. RESOL. 295 (2000); Kimberlee K. Kovatch & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation:
The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Riskin, Rethinking the
Grid, supra note 210.
227 Fuller, supra note 7, at 307.
228 FISHER & URY, supra note 17, at 10.
229 Id.
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mediation.230 Instead of aspiring toward satisfaction and promoting utilitarian
outcomes, conflict should be perceived not as a problem but as an
opportunity for moral growth.23' The measures of success provided by this
model are all related to process, and are reflected in the indications for both
empowerment and recognition suggested by Bush and Folger: parties are
empowered in mediation when they realize more clearly what their goals and
interests are, when they become aware of the range of options available to
secure their goals, when they increase or add to their own skills in conflict
resolution, when they gain new awareness of resources already in their
possession to achieve goals and objectives, and when they reflect, deliberate,
and make conscious decisions for themselves about what they want to do
regarding their conflict.232
Looking closely at the measures of empowerment reveals resonance
between the pragmatic principles of Getting To Yes and the indicators for
transformation: parties who can realize their interests and separate them from
the positions are empowered-they are capable of applying the principle,
"focus on interests, not positions;" if they become aware of more options,
they are capable of "inventing options for mutual gain." The improvement of
their dispute resolution skills and decisionmaking abilities empowers them to
become efficient pragmatic negotiators. The indicators for recognition
offered by Bush and Folger reflect a process orientation regarding the
pragmatic principle of "separate the people from the problem." They
delineate the psychological process of transcending the self-embedded
condition of the conflict while reaching out gradually to acknowledge the
other: parties give recognition in mediation when they realize their capacity
230 On the presentation of the transformative model as focusing on process see Part
IV.A.1. See also, Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the
Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WIS. L.
REV. 893. For an examination of dispute settlement through the dichotomy of
distributive and procedural justice as paralleling the pragmatic and transformative
dichotomy, see Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Expanding our Models of Justice
in Dispute Resolution: A Field Test of the Contribution of Interactional Justice
(Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, Feb. 7, 2002) (The author's
survey at the United States Postal Service (USPS) shows that the procedural justice
model better fits the data from a national employment transformative mediation
program than the distributive justice model. They also suggest that an interactional
model of justice, which includes measures of empowerment and recognition in a
transformative index, in addition to measures of process and resolution, can better
explain participant satisfaction with this program.).
231 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 81-84.
232 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 84-87.
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to reflect on the situation of the other and consider it, when they have desire
for giving recognition, when they give actual recognition by reinterpretation
and rethinking, when they express their recognition in words, and when they
are willing to give recognition in action. 233 The process offered by this model
reflects the transformation of the biased, self-interest motivated subject of
game theory and social psychology234 into a process-oriented pragmatist
subject of Getting to Yes.
The emphasis of the narrative model on process has unique implications.
The "dominant discourse" is, according to this model, a network of narratives
and ideologies that produce a conflict story in which the parties are caught.
Moving to the "alternative discourse," where stories of peace and coexistence
can prevail, requires an active process of deconstruction, reinterpretation and
rewriting the relationship between parties.235 Since conflicts exist only as
products of narratives and texts, and do not reflect real underlying needs
(pragmatic) or ill relationships (transformative), the only process to
overcome them requires engaging in an ongoing constructive interpretive
process, which deconstructs perceptions of entitlement.236 Thus, under the
narrative model, existence itself is related to an ongoing process of
interpretation and re-narration.
2. Underlying Hidden Layer
A basic conceptual gesture that repeats itself in each of the mediation
models is the idea that there is an underlying phase of conflicts disguised by
the surface of contradicting claims. Moving from the superficial misleading
surface of the conflict to the "real" underlying substance enables a "win-win"
unique mediation outcome which transcends distribution and competition.
The pragmatic model defines this underling phase as containing interests or
needs, while the transformative model refers to emotions and the narrative
model addresses entitlements. The three models of mediation repeat the
message that "things are not as they appear," and all aspire to resolve conflict
while addressing a level which is below the surface of the conflict and what
currently appear to be the parties' concerns. As Avruch points out in his book
233 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 89-91.
234 For a description of the negotiator image as reflected in theoretical studies of
negotiation, see Michal Alberstein, Negotiating Through Paradoxes: Rationality,
Practicality, and Naive Realism (Or: "Enjoy your Biases'), 22 STUD. L. POL. SOC'Y
197 (2001).
235 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 82-92.
236 id. at 52-54.
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Culture and Conflict Resolution, there are two possible conceptions of
conflict from which the emerging studies of negotiation and dispute
resolution (what is referred to as ADR) have taken only one.237 The first
definition regards conflict as "a struggle over values and claims to scare
status, power, and resources, a struggle in which the aims of opponents are to
neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals."238 The second definition provides that
"conflict means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that parties'
current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously." 239 The second
definition, which emphasizes perception and belief, is the one adopted by all
three models of mediation as part of the basic inclination of the whole
emerging discipline (or "quasi discipline," as Avruch suggests) 240 of dispute
resolution. Avruch explains that the new discourse favors strategies of
collaboration and problem-solving over avoidance, competition or any other
bargaining strategy: "Resolution aims somehow to get to the root causes of a
conflict, and not merely to treat its episodic or symptomatic manifestation,
that is, a particular dispute." 241
Getting to the root causes of a conflict is accompanied by an optimistic
construction of these causes as given to manipulation and conciliation. Under
the pragmatic model perspective, the needs are compatible and given to
mutual satisfaction, unlike the positions that are exclusive and oppositional.
According to the transformative model, behind the unspoken needs lay the
untreated feelings and the wounded relationships that are the core of the
conflict. The narrative model claims that the exaggerated entitlement
perceptions of the parties produce the conflict by composing the dominant
discourse. The key element of mediation is to go beyond the surface of the
conflict and to deny its appearance as contradictory and competitive, while
aspiring to reach the underlying true sources of it and to manage them toward
resolution. Instead of searching for "true" feelings or addressing unmet
needs, the postmodern agenda "is about opening up previously unavailable
worlds of meaning." 242 The construction of the conflict as "perception
237 See AVRUCH, supra note 5, at 24-47.
238 Id. at 24 (quoting L. COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT 8 (1956)).
239 Id. at 24 (quoting J. RUBIN ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE,
AND SETTLEMENTS 5 (2d ed. 1994)).
240 Id. at 26.
241 Id.
242 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 125: "If something is a problem within the
dominant narratives with which the parties to a dispute are making sense of things, the
challenge becomes to deconstruct the narrative itself, to see it as a framework of meaning
rather than an essential and enduring truth ....
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based," and the reference to a manageable level that conditions it, is shared
by all models of mediation and is typical to the modem study of conflict
resolution. 243
3. Emotions Acknowledgement
A unique characteristic of mediation, as compared to adjudication,
arbitration, and other processes, is its emphasis on emotions and
interpersonal relationships, aspects that are traditionally not addressed
directly through adjudicative processes. Under a classical perception of
modem law, emotions and relationships are considered matters of the
individuals in their private lives outside the courts, and conflicts should be
handled based on rational arguments and evidence that the parties choose to
bring before the judge. 244 The modem interest in dispute resolution reflects a
growing interest in emotions and presents them as integral parts of the
conflict picture.245 Following developing research on the importance of
emotions as sources of information 246 and as having a rational level which is
given to understanding, mediation studies increase the focus on emotions and
provide explicit manuals to handle them and to understand their role within a
conflict.2
4 7
The pragmatic model defines the first principle of integrative negotiation
as "separating the people from the problem." The principle of
depersonalization is reflected in this formula and is related to the constructive
management of emotions.248 In later formulations of the Harvard Negotiation
Project's pragmatic offer, emotions receive further reflection. In the 1999
book Difficult Conversations, the emotions conversation is considered a
difficult challenge for parties who must try to "have their feelings. '249 The
243 See CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 1-3 (Kevin Avruch
et al. eds., 1991).
244 See Fuller's definition of adjudication in Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
245 See EXPLAINING EMOTIONS (A. Rorty ed., 1980); Daniel. L. Shapiro, Negotiating
Emotions, 20 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 67 (2002).
246 See Shapiro, supra note 245, at 67-82.
247 ROGER FISHER & DAVID SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOU
NEGOTIATE (2005).
248 See FISHER & URY, supra note 17, at 29-32.
249 See DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATRON & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT
CONVERSATIONS: How TO DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST (Penguin Group 1999). In
response to the feeling conversation, the advice is "have your feelings (or they will have
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latest book by the project, written by Ury and Shapiro, is dedicated entirely
to emotions and tries to treat them as positions which cover real concerns that
can be answered if only addressed. 250 Management of emotions and
reference to them as representing other elements of the conflict is central to
the three pragmatic phases of handling difficult conversations.
The transformative model suggests an even more central role for
emotions in mediation. Bush and Folger define one of the hallmarks of
transformative mediation as the idea that "there are facts in the feelings."
251
This principle suggests that, in contrast to the initial pragmatic suggestion to
vent emotions, parties "have" them but then move on to the substantial
discussion which aims to rationally resolve the conflict based on interests and
creative invention. The transformative model offers to view emotions as real
resources of information. 252 Emotions signify past relationships between self
and other, and understanding them might help to transform dysfunctional
patterns and to promote empowerment and recognition. 25
3
According to the narrative model, emotions are meaningful expressions
within a narrative. Winslade and Monk suggest that the postmodern turn
implies a search for meaning. "Rather than searching for resolution through
the expression of 'true' feelings or by addressing essential interests... the
postmodem agenda is about opening up previously unavailable worlds of
meaning." 254 The mediator aspires to deconstruct the narratives of the parties
and perceives them as frameworks of meaning rather than essential truths.255
Emotions and facts are intertwined within this framework of meaning and are
treated as equally important.
4. Constructive Conflict Intervention
The emphasis on process and emotions, and the depiction of an
underlying true layer that conditions conflicts, are not enough for an
you)." Id. at 85. The authors advise parties to negotiate with their feelings, describe them
carefully, and avoid judgment. Id. at 99-105.
250 See FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 247.
251 Bush & Folger, supra note 92, at 271.
252 Id. "In transformative practice, third parties view the expression of emotions-
anger, hurt, frustration, and so on-as an integral part of the conflict process... since the
expression of emotions often indicates important opportunities for empowerment and
recognition."
2 5 3 Id. at 271-72.
254 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 125.
255 Id. at 72.
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understanding of the unique language of mediation. The constructive positive
gaze that characterizes this engagement represents an element of choice
which does not have a theoretical foundation and is explained differently
within each model. Insofar as the models differ from one another, they all
share a unique preference for constructive positive intervention, even if the
theoretical foundation assumed by each might lead to destructive
"resolutions" as well.
The pragmatic model, at least in the way Fisher describes it, is motivated
by an urge to become "activist" and to engage in reality in a constructive
mode. Fisher is not interested in the theoretical external account of
negotiation, which maintains that negotiations can be either competitive or
collaborative and that it all depends on the "motivational orientation" of the
parties. 256 He does not accept the claim of a tension existing between
claiming and creating values in negotiation as a reflection of the inherent
prisoner dilemma that characterizes the bargaining situation,257 and is not
256 In social psychology terms, the interdependence which exists in any bargaining
situation can exhibit three kinds of dynamics:
Motivational orientation (MO) refers most generally to ones bargainer's
attitudinal disposition toward another and may be usefully described in terms of
three extreme cases .... A bargainer has a cooperative MO to the extent that he has
a positive interest in the other's welfare as well as in his own. A competitive MO
denotes an interest in doing better than the other, while at the same time doing as
well for oneself as possible. A bargainer with an individualistic MO is simply
interested in maximizing his own outcomes, regardless of how the other fares.
JEFFERY Z. RUBIN & BERT R. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND
NEGOTIATION 198 (1975). According to this view, the negotiation can take a cooperative,
competitive, or individualistic mode. Descriptively, these three possibilities capture the
variety of choices for the parties involved. The actual dynamic in each case is a matter of
the bargainer's "attitudinal disposition."
2 5 7 See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 30 (1986). Lax and Sebenius
present a prisoner's dilemma inherent in any negotiation, based on the tension between
creating and claiming value:
A deeper analysis shows that the competitive and cooperative elements are
inextricably entwined. In practice, they cannot be separated. This bonding is
fundamentally important to the analysis, structuring, and conduct of negotiation.
There is a central, inescapable tension between cooperative moves to create value
jointly and competitive moves to gain individual advantages. This tension affects
virtually all tactical and strategic choice. Analysts must come to grips with it;
negotiators must manage it. Neither denial nor discomfort will make it disappear.
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interested in the balanced formula of "the mixed motive" in negotiation. 258
He aspires to transcend the academic stance of a spectator, and to engage in
reality in a problem-solving mode.259 As he and his coauthor claim in his
book Beyond Machiavelli:
Most university courses and scholarly texts approach international
relations from the standpoint of a spectator. They seek to produce an
explanatory structure .... If we want knowledge in order to improve the
world, then predictability is the wrong standard. We need to turn from what
is inevitable to those things we can change. 260
Fisher himself emphasizes this prescriptive view when he admits that he
is more concerned with "what intelligent people ought to do" than with "the
way the world is." 261 When he states that Getting to Yes "blurs a desirable
Id.; see also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET, & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO,
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press 2000).
258 See Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in Conflict Resolution
and How to Overcome Them, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 218 (Morton Deutsch & Peter Colman eds., 2000).
If you view the world through the lens of a fixed-pie vision, the choices are
pretty clear: either hold out to protect your own interests, which are by definition
opposed to the other's, or cooperate with the other party so that some kind of
compromise can be reached. Cooperation and competition are thought to be the yin
and yang of conflict resolution, and it is true that most conflicts are mixed-motive in
the sense that we are motivated to get as much of the pie as we can for ourselves, but
at the same time motivated to work together with the other person to ensure we
reach mutual agreement. We argue, though, that this is a false dichotomy in most
instances, because we need not choose to behave purely cooperatively or purely
competitively. There a third, enlightened strategy, which we call strategic creativity.
Id
259 See FISHER ET AL., supra note 99, at 4 ("In this book we have adopted the style of
a handbook or how-to manual, to encourage an activist and problem-solving approach
among people who like to-or must-think about tough problems."). The reference to
Machiavelli as a model was already made by Fisher in 1969 in Roger Fisher, Improving
Compliance with International Law 1-4 (1969) (unpublished, with permission of the
author, on file in Harvard Law School Special Collection) ("In trying to understand
international affairs it is useful to ask: what is the advice which a wise and up-to-date
Machiavelli would give to a modern prince?").
260 FISHER ET AL., supra note 99, at 8-9.
261 See Roger Fisher, Reply to, The Pros and Cons of 'Getting to Yes,' 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 115, 120-24 (1984). Fisher, while responding to a book review by White, claims
that his book excludes the competitive inevitable aspect of bargaining. Id.
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distinction between descriptive analysis and prescriptive advice," 262 in fact,
he claims that he borrowed this orientation from legal advocacy: just as a
lawyer arguing a case, the pragmatic mediator promotes a constructive
approach to conflict resolution without considering the other possible
dynamics. 263
The transformative model of mediation defines the constructive
orientation of the process using its own distinct intellectual background: that
of the relational worldview. Bush and Folger perceive the pragmatic model
as promoting the value of satisfaction, which is based on the individualist
worldview, 264 and hence, the constructive leap of Getting to Yes, in denial of
the prisoner dilemmas, is not their concern. Their own "leap" is performed
262 Id. at 123-24.
Getting to Yes as a whole, I believe, blurs a desirable distinction between
descriptive analysis and prescriptive advice. Descriptively, it sorts facts into useful
categories: positions vs. interests; people issues vs. substantive ones; inventing vs.
deciding; discussing what negotiators will or won't do vs. discussing what they
ought to do. Those distinctions, like distinctions between reptiles and mammals, or
between short snakes and long snakes, are objectively true and, despite possible
difficulties in drawing lines, exist as facts in the real world. Whether or not they are
useful is another question. We go beyond suggesting these descriptive categories by
advancing some prescriptive rules of thumb, indicated by the chapter heading in the
book.
Id.
Using this natural-science image of biology, and making the fact-clue distinction
while the facts are considered "objective truth," locates Fisher even earlier than the 1950s
and the Legal Process materials. Hart and Sacks believed, according to their Zeitgeist,
that the social sciences were different from the natural ones in being more judgmatical.
See PRAGMATISM: FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO POSTMODERNISM 227 (Robert Hollinger &
David Depew eds., 1995); see also HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 107 (1994). "These materials
proceed upon the conviction that the science of society is essentially a judgmatical, or
prudential, science demanding modes of inquiry and reflection which are sharply at
variance with the procedures conventionally thought to be appropriate in the natural
sciences." Id.
263 See Fisher, supra note 99.
Like a lawyer arguing a case, I may sometimes get carried away with the merits
of the position being urged. This does not trouble me much. As a firm believer in the
adversary system I am convinced that wise decisions are more likely to result from
having competing views advanced forcefully than from having everyone play the
role ofjudge.
Id. at 12.
264 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 234-37.
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by constructing their unique understanding of the relation worldview. They
posit it as transcending the dichotomy between the individualist and organic
worldviews:
Indeed, the central feature of human nature, when perceived from the
starting place of the transformation value, is neither individuality nor
connectedness (and their associated qualities) but the element that relates
the two in an integrated, whole humane consciousness-the relational
capacity. Human beings are thus simultaneously separate and connected,
autonomous and linked, self-interested and self-transcending. 265
According to the relational worldview, human beings are indeed
considered simultaneously separated and connected, but positive
transformation is not necessarily the horizon of this condition. A more
"balanced" presentation of this worldview is indeed offered by Ian Macneil
regarding contract law.266 Macneil diagnoses an inherent tension between
solidarity and individual utility that underlies modem contract law and
human behavior, and describes in different ways the play between discrete
norms and relational norms in specific contractual situations.267
The narrative model has its own constructiveness, which is framed
within the postmodem worldview, but carries its unique optimistic bias
equivalent to the three models. Having emerged from a worldview which
265 Id. at 243.
266 See Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L.
REV. 340 (1983); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1982); Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social
Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567 (Apr. 1986); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:
AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980). For a critique of the biased
and limited relational claim of Bush and Folger, see Neal Milner, Mediation and Political
Theory: A Critique of Bush and Folger, 21 L. Soc. INQUIRY 737 (1996).
267 See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 264, at 348, 349-66:
Man is, in the most fundamental sense of the word, irrational, and no amount of
reasoning, no matter how sophisticated, will produce a complete and consistent
account of human behaviors, customs or institutions. Two principles of behavior are
essential to the survival of such a creature: solidarity and reciprocity. Man, being a
choosing creature, is easily capable of paralysis of decision when two conflicting
desires are in equipoise .... While all the contract norms operate in the behavior
and in the internal principles and rules of all kinds of contracts, some assume special
importance in discrete transactions and others assume special importance in
contractual relations.
Id. at 348.
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reflects a critique of liberalism and irony toward constructive modernist
projects,268 Winslade and Monk must first justify their initial claim to derive
a practical constructive model from a critical relativist worldview. They
manage to do so by building on a preliminary stage developed in narrative
therapy, 269 and by suggesting that "social constructionism offers a useful set
of ideas on which to base an approach to mediation that is both theoretically
robust and intensely practical. '270 In other words, the narrative model uses
the worldview as a tool to improve mediation practice, and in that sense, it
assumes the constructive task of resolving conflict as a foundation for the
whole theoretical engagement. It is interesting to see how Winslade and
Monk respond to writers representing the same worldview, who expose the
"dark side" of postmodernism by offering a critique of mediation practice. In
response, for example, to Cobb's description of the coercive potential of the
first narrative in mediation as determining the rest of the process, 271 the
authors suggest that every utterance in mediation can operate in the same
way and change the power dynamic between the parties. 272
People can choose simply not to respond to what the first speaker has
said but to choose their own narrative trajectory. If the act of speaking is an
act of construction in a power relation, then it is not the structural position of
speaking first that makes speaking powerful but the way people operate on
each other all the time in conversation, of which speaking first is but one
example. 273
In the same mode, Winslade and Monk use Foucault, who was deeply
suspicious of any pretension to transcend power or to build constructive
progressive models, to balance it.274 Foucault would probably mock the
claim that harmony and justice may be reached through narrative
268 For a discussion of postmodemism and its tenets, including irony, see RICHARD
RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
2 6 9 MICHAEL WHITE & DAVID EPSTON, NARRATIVE MEANS TO THERAPEUTIC ENDS
(1990).
270See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 37; David. A. Pare, Culture and
Meaning: Expanding the Metaphorical Repertoire of Family Therapy, 35 FAM. PROCESS
21-42 (1996).
271 Sara Cobb, A Narrative Perspective on Mediation: Toward the Materialization
of the 'Storytelling' Metaphor, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN MEDIATION: COMMUNICATION
RESEARCH AND PERSPECTIVES 48 (Joseph P. Folger & Tricia S. Jones eds., 1994).
272 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 2 1, at 138.
273 Id.
2 7 4 THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT: SELECTIONS FROM ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT
1954-1984 (Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose eds., 2003).
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mediation,275 yet still the authors view his claims of power, knowledge, and
discipline as opening up opportunities 276 or as "invitations to a particular
conversational pattern." 277
Chart III: Cultures of Mediation-Commonalities and Differences
Pragmatic Transformative Narrative
Mediation Mediation Mediation
A meta- Transcending Storytelling and
Process negotiation satisfaction while narrative as
Emphasis regarding the focusing on process producing a newprocess reality
Interest and Emotions and self- Exaggerated
Underlying needs as the other relationship as entitlementddenrLyg silent movers of the core of conflicts perceptionsHidden Layer the conflict
Separating Emotions signify Emotions as
Emotions emotions from facts and should be having meaning
Acknowledge- the real issues examined within a
ment narrative
Preferring the Preferring the Preferring the
activist constructive side of constructive
constructive the relational view of
Constructive mode over the worldview postmodemism
Positive intellectual
Intervention balanced
position of the
social sciences
B. Differences
What is the relation between the models, and what is the theoretical
hierarchy between them? How can we decide which culture of mediation is
suitable for a certain conflict? How should a situation be evaluated when
275 For a basic presentation of the "discipline" characterizing the human condition,
and especially the professions, according to Foucault, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977).
276 WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 21, at 50.
277 Id. at 118.
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each one of the models offers a different account of the conflict? What
happens if each party to the conflict requires a different model? This section
can offer only a preliminary inquiry into these questions while thickening the
theoretical layers described in the previous parts.
Referring to the theoretical "hierarchy" between the models, on the one
hand, the sequence described reflects an intellectual development in which
each model contains the other in a sense, while providing a new paradigm to
deal with mediation. The transformative model claims to transcend the
satisfaction story by providing a more advanced perception of the human
subject, and by offering the relational worldview and ethics of care as prior
to any needs or material necessities. 278 This model might be perceived as a
preparation for a problem-solving process that will occur "outside the
room,"279 or simply as a more moral and complex approach as compared to
the problem-solving formula.280 The narrative model is another effort to
enrich the mediation discourse by combining relational sensitivity with
narrative focus. It claims to go beyond the needs and the emotions per se, and
exposes the underlying ideology that informs the entitlement perception of
the parties. In a sense it provides the highest theoretical account of the
conflict as a socio-political-emotional event, which can be handled through
an interpretive scheme. It reflects the shift of mediation between the social
sciences and the humanities: the pragmatic model is still embedded within a
theoretical scientific-rational paradigm of conflict resolution281 as related to
biases and management, the transformative model challenges this notion of
conflict, and the narrative model takes the full step toward an interpretive
paradigm of addressing conflicts282-a paradigm which assumes the
narrative to be the material from which mediation is made.
278 BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 19, at 253-59.
279 See Bush & Folger, supra note 92, at 273 ("To put it differently, the
transformative practitioner realizes that, while the parties work on defining and solving
the problem 'out there,' the intervener should be trying to enrich the working process-
the disputants' decision making and perspective taking-in the room.").
280 For a discussion of the transformative mediation as a reflection of a theoretical
development within the mediation discourse see Dorothy J. Della Noce, Mediation
Theory and Policy: The Legacy of the Pound Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
545 (2002).
281 For an illustration of the main principles of the rational paradigm and its relation
to biases see ARROW ET AL., supra note 12, at 3-24.
282 For a preliminary understanding of the interpretive paradigm, see LUDWIG
WrITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1958). For a discussion of such a
turn in the legal field see Feldman, supra note 140.
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On the other hand, assuming each model to represent a culture requires
accepting that the internal values of mediation entail an equal treatment of
each model while assigning all equivalent worth as representing legitimate
worldviews. "Cultural relativism" should be the guiding rule when dealing
with intercultural negotiation,283 and respecting the internal point of view of
each model cannot coexist with the assumption that any one is more
advanced theoretically. In some sense, the problem we have here is not
atypical of any democratic system that searches for a conception of the good
without a consensual basis for judgment, and the tension between the
hierarchy and equality will probably keep pervading the play between
models.
In terms of "fitting the forum to the fuss," 284 the pragmatic model seems
to fit business oriented conflicts, solution oriented problems, and individuals
who experience their identity in the classic liberal sense. The transformative
model suits more relational contexts and cases that involve deep
interdependence and emotional intensity. Forms of justice, such as truth
committees or victim-offender mediation, are most suitable for transitional
justice situations, where a whole population must go through a healing
process and a rebuilding of the social order. These are situations where a
strong element of identity is involved. The narrative model is best applicable
to conflicts between intellectuals or in cases where a clear progressive new
regime is prevailing in the public sphere, such as divorce cases. These are
cases where the transformation of the legal regime in the last few decades has
been so tremendous that parties can advance within the existing transformed
regime. Significant symbolic transformations in the broad society, from the
kind achieved by the feminist movement and encouraged by other economic
and political conditions, positively affect the capacity of the parties to
educate themselves and to reenact their guiding entitlements. Such an
opportunity seems to exist much less in other identity struggles, where
imbalances are much stronger and the minority group has not achieved
enough judicial and symbolic recognition. Parties in the private mediation
session do not seem capable of transforming the prevailing regime through
283 See, e.g., EVERETt M. ROGERS & THOMAS M. STEINFATr, INTERCULTURAL
COMMUNICATION 231 (1999).
2 84 See Sander & Goldberg, supra note 151. The expression is taken from the
famous article by Goldberg and Sander, which provides the basic measures to sort out
conflicts that enter an ADR system or arrive before the ADR lawyer.
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their narrative reenactments. Such interactions might lead to oppression or
reproduction of the prevailing order.
V. CONCLUSION
Referring to the mediation field as a multicultural sphere in which
various intellectual traditions provide distinct formulas for handling conflict
situations, enriches the prevailing theoretical discussions in mediation and
provides a more systematic account of some of the burning questions of this
developing area. Discussions of mediation in criminal cases, transitional
justice, public ADR, and international rules of law can be inspired by
cultures of mediation which are analyzed in this Paper and can engage
diverse accounts of institutional methods to achieve consent in contemporary
conflicts. From a theoretical point of view, the exploration of the different
formulas suggested by the three intellectual worldviews-liberalism, the
critique of liberalism through transformative or communal values, and
postmodernism-suggests an example of the potential of critique of
liberalism to produce practical constructive models to address emerging
conflicts. Relational ideals of ethics of care and postmodern perceptions of
social constructionism are common in our everyday practice, but mediation
studies aspire to implement them into concrete situations by suggesting the
proper procedures to do so.
In spite of the differences between the intellectual traditions and their
versions of mediation, this Paper also suggests that mediation has unique
discursive elements that exist in each model. Acknowledging the
commonalities and differences between the models will hopefully contribute
to an enriched practice and a more comprehensive theory of mediation.
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